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Abstract 
The publish/subscribe paradigm is used to support a many-to-many model that allows 
an efficient dissemination of messages across a distributed system. Message Oriented 
Middleware (MOM) is a middleware that provides an asynchronous method of 
passing information between networked applications. MOMs can be based on a 
publish/subscribe model, which offers a robust paradigm for message delivery. This 
research is concerned with this specific type of MOM. Recently, systems using 
MOMs have been used to integrate enterprise systems over geographically distributed 
areas, like the ones used in financial services, telecommunication applications, 
transportation and health-care systems. However, the reliability of a MOM system 
must be verified and consideration given to reachability to all intended destinations 
typically with to guarantees of delivery.  
The research in this thesis provides an automated means of checking the 
(re)configuration of a publish/subscribe MOM system by building a model and using 
Linear-time Temporal Logic and Computation Tree Logic rules to verify certain 
constraints. The verification includes the checking of the reachability of different 
topics, the rules for regulating the working of the system, and checking the 
configuration and reconfiguration after a failure. The novelty of this work is the 
creation and the optimization of a symbolic model checker that abstracts the 
end-to-end network configuration and reconfiguration behaviour and using it to verify 
reachability and loop detection. In addition a GUI interface, a code generator and a 
sub-paths detector are implemented to make the system checking more user-friendly 
and efficient.  
The research then explores another aspect of reliability. The requirements of mission 
critical service delivery over a MOM infrastructure is considered and we propose a 
new way of supporting rapid recovery from failures using pre-calculated routing 
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tables and coloured flows that can operate across multiple Autonomous System 
domains. The approach is critically appraised in relation to other published schemes. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and Motivation 
A telephone communication system is a typical synchronous system. A synchronous 
system [51] involves tight coupling which requires both the caller and the callee to be 
available at the same time. This kind of systems causes considerable problems when 
trying to implement certain forms of communication between end-systems or 
managing the interaction between clients and servers in regard to fault tolerance, 
availability, and so forth). Therefore, asynchronous systems have become a popular 
alternative. Like an email system, an asynchronous system [52] has queues to store 
messages transitionally, guaranteeing that messages are retained even after failures 
occur. A key advantage over traditional synchronous solutions in terms of fault 
tolerance and overall system flexibility is that asynchronous system components do 
not need to be operational at the time a request is made. Queues provide a way to 
communicate across diverse networks and systems while still being able to make 
some assumptions about the behaviour of the messages. Message Oriented 
Middleware (MOM) is a loosely coupling asynchronous infrastructure [3, 4, 5, 45]. A 
MOM is an infrastructure focused on sending and receiving messages that allows 
application modules to be distributed over heterogeneous platforms [2].  
MOM provides messaging services between the transport layer and application layer 
[1, 6]. Processes and/or applications do not need to know the existence of each other, 
so it allows communication in an asynchronous, decoupled manner. In a topic-based 
publish/subscribe MOM, each message is classified as belonging to one of a fixed set 
of topics. There can be an arbitrary number of topics in the system. A publisher labels 
each message it produces with a particular topic. Similarly, the subscriber has the 
ability to express their interest in a topic or a pattern of topics to a broker in a suitable 
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data structure. When a component publishes a message, the broker matches this 
against existing subscriptions, and delivers the message to all those application 
components that issued matching subscriptions that are local or at neighbouring 
brokers, and optionally performs message mediation. Each component can publish 
and subscribe to one or many topics. Due of its nature, a MO M system is widely 
recognized as a promising solution for communication between dissimilar systems. 
During the communication phase, brokers located at different geographical areas may 
experience unexpected failure of a broker or an interconnection.  
As one of the most popular applications in MOM, mission critical 
enterprise-computing systems, such as banking systems and stock markets, are the 
focus of this research. A mission critical system is a system that is essential to the 
survival of a business or organization. When a mission critical system fails or is 
interrupted, business operations are significantly impacted. A mission critical 
message oriented middleware application requires reliable and efficiency message 
delivery [46, 47, 103, 104, 106]. Messages are assumed to be time sensitive so it is 
critical to employ an overlay network fast recovery scheme. Given the growing size 
and complexity of MOM-based mission critical overlay networks, the presence of 
component failures is expected to be an everyday occurrence. Hence, considerable 
attention has been devoted to the problem of fast recovery from link failures [53, 54, 
55].  
Recent studies show that network access control configuration is one of the most 
complex and error prone network management tasks [7]. For this reason, network 
misconfiguration has become the main source of network unreachability and 
vulnerability problems. To achieve resilience, an efficient way to (re)configure the 
system is necessary. The main idea of configuring and reconfiguring systems is to 
make sure that the systems works normally under various conditions. However, if the 
protocols which determine the configuration and reconfiguration have flaws in 
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themselves, the (re)configuration will be unreliable. Therefore, it is important t o find 
a means of verifying that the configuration protocol or mechanism is correct for a 
self-healing MOM system. 
Moreover, one of the advantages of using a publish/subscribe structure in a MOM 
system is that it allows the MOM system to be more flexible [56]. This is because an 
additional logical layer, called the dispatcher, mediates communications; the brokers, 
publishers and subscribers’ information is dynamically controlled by the dispatcher. 
As a consequence, new components can join a federation, become immediately active, 
and cooperate with the others without requiring any reconfiguration of the 
architecture. Furthermore, any addition or deletion of publishers or subscribers will 
not affect other devices. However, this flexibility of adding or removing devices 
impedes the validation of a publish/subscribe system. The verification of applications 
developed using this paradigm is a challenging task. It is easy to configure an 
individual device like a broker or a firewall, but it is extreme complex to attempt the 
configuration of a large network with many connections between devices [7]. 
Components are often written independently of the way they are federated and their 
interactions can change dynamically. Manual analysis of the interaction among the 
policies of the many devices in the network with different syntax and semantics is 
unfeasible [8]. A reduced / abstracted model of a system can enable complex 
problems to be represented in a simpler form. Verifying all the rules based on this 
model is thus tractable. Hence, this research focuses on building a MOM system 
model and verifying the reachability and reconfiguration rules of the modelled 
system. 
Protocols for the real-time restoration of mesh transport networks have been studied 
for several years [105, 106, 107, 108, 109]. Investigators generally agree that it is 
feasible for such protocols to compute a set of replacement paths for span restoration 
in under 2 seconds [109], which is fast enough to avoid large scale consequences 
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within the network. However, there is still a significant motivation to increase the 
speed of mesh-based restoration schemes [109].  
Though MOM is an overlay system, it depends on the underlay network layer. If the 
network layer fails, it will affect the resilience of the MOM system. With larger 
network sizes of MOM systems to meet increasing demands, there is a higher chance 
of broker failure. As a resilient system, it is important for a MOM system to have an 
effective fast recovery mechanism for link or broker failures.  
1.2 Research Contributions 
This research proposes two means of promoting the resilience in a mission critical 
MOM system. This research proposes a model-checking tool to verify the reachability 
and reconfiguration rules of MOM systems. In addition, in order to recover rapidly 
from failure, this thesis proposes a Pre-Calculated Routing Table (PCRT) algorithm 
that is simpler, faster, loop free and more robust than several state-of-the-art network 
fast recovery mechanisms [105]. More precisely, this thesis provides several 
contributions to better achieve resilience in a realistic MOM system as follows: 
1. From the year 1996 to 2013, there are over 500 papers published by IEEE, ACM 
and Springer regarding publish/subscribe paradigms and systems. However, less 
than 60 combined model-checking tools are proposed to verify the software and 
protocol correctness belonging to a publish/subscribe infrastructure. None of them 
used model-checking tools to validate the (re)configuration of an overlay network, 
characteristic of a publish/subscribe-based Message Orientated Middleware 
(MOM) system. To our knowledge this research is the first to propose the use of a 
formal verification model checker tool to validate the (re)configuration of a MOM 
overlay network.  
2. Publish/subscribe systems are hard to validate. In particular, given the inherent 
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non-determinism in the order of received events, delays in event delivery, and 
variability in the timing of event announcements, consequently, the number of 
possible system states becomes combinatorial large.  
This research automatically generates a finite-state MOM model in a model 
checking language, called New Symbolic Model Checker (NuSMV). Using a 
model checking method combined with Computation Tree Logic (CTL) or Linear 
Time Logic (LTL) [39] or possibly other types of logic statement can ensure that 
a MOM overlay functions as expected upon reconfiguration in accordance with 
the requirements of the business model (end user or application). A novel 
NuSMV Code Generator is designed in Java that reads a Hash Map file created by 
a Graphical User Interface (GUI) front-end process from which a full NuSMV 
MOM model is generated with all the specifications necessary for verification 
within a NuSMV verification environment.  
3. However, verifying the reachability of e very topic can take a considerable amount 
of time. Therefore, a novel method of identifying sub-paths in a network is 
developed. This research uses these sub-paths to eliminate duplicate paths by 
verifying the reachability of ‘super paths’. In this way considerable time can be 
saved in respect to the verification of the reachability of topics.  
4. As a MOM is an overlay system, it depends on the underlay network layer. If the 
network layer fails, it will affect the resilience of the MOM system. With 
increases in the network size of MOM systems to support additional distributed 
customer end-systems and to meet the increasing traffic demands, there is an 
associated higher chance of virtual link failures between brokers, or indeed broker 
failures. As a resilient system, it is important for a MOM system to have methods 
in place to handle link/links and broker failures.  
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This research presents a novel algorithm, with a ‘colour’ representation of the 
network state as a factor, for pre-calculating routing tables and condensing them 
into a single super routing table per node to save space. This algorithm guarantees 
100% fast recovery from single link failures or single node failures. In addition, 
shortest path first (SPF) [57, 58] routing is maintained even after a failure has 
happened. Since all the calculation of routing tables is performed in advance, the 
online time needed to run the SPF calculation is avoided. This Pre-Calculated 
Routing Table algorithm is compared with two other popular fast recovery 
schemes [101, 102] (i.e. IP Fast Recovery and the Resilient Routing Layers 
algorithm) and provides favourable results.  
5. As part of the proactive PCRT algorithm, a novel idea of super condensed routing 
table is provided. Rather than storing routing tables for every failure situation, this 
research proposed to merge those routing tables into one super condensed routing 
table avoiding redundant entries as we note that quite a lot of routing tables share 
the same routing entries for different failure situations. Using the novel ‘colour’ 
concept and a two-dimensional array, a corresponding routing entry in a super 
condensed routing table can be located directly, avoiding the need to perform 
searches and so provide low latency access to the appropriate next hop data and 
other routing information.  
1.3 Author’s Publications 
As part of this research the following publications have been produced by the author.  
Y. Jia, E. Bodanese, J. Bigham, ‘Model Checking of the Reliability of 
Publish/Subscribe Structure Based System’, First IEEE International Conference on 
Communications in China, Beijing, August 2012, pp 173-178. 
(This paper provides a novel and scalable design for abstracting a MOM overlay 
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network into a model for formal verification)  
Y. Jia, E. Bodanese, J. Bigham, ‘Checking the Robustness of a Publish/Subscribe 
Based Message Oriented System’, IV International Congress on Ultra Modern 
Telecommunications and Control Systems, St. Petersburg, October 2012, pp 291-296. 
(This paper proposes a sub-path detection algorithm to reduce verificat ion time. The 
paper also describes our Code Generator for translating MOM overlay network into a 
model checker model) 
Y. Jia, E. Bodanese, C. Phillips, J. Bigham, and R. Tao. ‘Improved Reliability of 
Large Scale Publish/Subscribe based MOMs using Model Checking’, in Proc. of 
IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS’14), Poland, 
2014. 
(This paper models a realistically large-scale MOM overlay network and specifically 
shows the data structures and procedures employed by the Code Generator)  
Y. Jia, C. Phillips. ‘Fast and Reliable IP Recovery for Overlay Routing in Mission 
Critical Message Oriented Middleware’, 8th International Conference on Frontier of 
Computer Science and Technology (FCST2014), Chendu, China, December 19-21, 
2014. Submitted 
(This paper presents a novel algorithm for pre-calculating routing tables and 
condensing them to save space. The algorithm is compared with two other popular 
fast recovery schemes and provides favourable results)  
1.4 Thesis Organization 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents the main 
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features underpinning MOM systems. Firstly, it describes the publish/subscribe 
concept followed by the message queuing paradigm. It presents Java Message Service 
(JMS) [24, 25] as the first implementation of a message oriented middleware system. 
The Advanced Message Queue Protocol (AMQP) [21, 22. 23] is then introduced as 
one of the protocols used to implement publish/subscribe MOMs together with a 
broker implementation using Open Source AMQP Messa ge (Qpid) [21] from Apache. 
IBM WebSphere [98, 139,140] is described as a real implementation of a message 
queuing system. The chapter then concludes with an analysis of the similarities and 
differences between both approaches , including a critical appraisal of their major 
advantages and disadvantages by comparing the presented MOM systems. In addition, 
several state-of-the-art measures of fast recovery from a network failure are 
introduced in this chapter.  
Chapter 3 then presents Temporal Logic [39] concepts that are used in the proposed 
model checker, called New Symbolic Model Checker (NuSMV) [38], and how they 
are expressed. Following this, Chapter 4 provides a review of related literature and 
shows the importance and usefulness of model checking large-scale systems like 
MOM networks. The chapter also presents and critically appraises published work 
concerned with modelling publish/subscribe systems and how they relate to the 
original work subsequently presented in this thesis. The chapter concludes with an 
analysis of the main differences between the state-of-the-art and the contributions 
proposed in this thesis.  
Chapter 5 describes two abstracted MOM models together with an innovative way for 
generating NuSMV models and specifications. The time taken to generate models of 
different MOM sizes is examined. Moreover, to avoid the state ‘explosion’ problem, a 
sub-path detection method is developed in this research and the improvements it 
provides are evaluated.  
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Chapter 6 considers a MOM system of realistic size and number of topics. A 
user-friendly interface and a routing table generation program are designed to provide 
a much easier way for users to model a large-scale MOM system. Sub-path detection 
is also implemented into this model. This thesis also presents a novel method to verify 
the link table when the routing table is not available in advance.  
In addition to ensuring state information is valid, a further means of improving the 
robustness of a MOM is to investigate resilience measures so that inevitable  failures 
can be accommodated in an appropriate way. To this end, Chapter 7 introduces a 
novel approach of pre-calculating routing table algorithm to allow for speedy recovers 
from various forms of failure. Detailed explanations, examples and simulations of this 
algorithm are provided. Moreover, an assessment of the scheme compared with 
state-of-the-art alternatives is also provided in this chapter and demonstrates its 
superior performance. 
Finally, Chapter 8 provides a summary of the key conclusions of this research and 
also considers possibilities for future work.  
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2 Message Oriented Middleware Systems 
and Overlay Networks for Fast Recovery 
2.1 Message Oriented Middleware Systems 
The scale of distributed systems [59] has increased considerably. Distributed systems 
may involve thousands of entities potentially distributed all over the world. There is a 
need for a linking infrastructure to bind large distributed systems together in a reliable 
manner. This infrastructure is supported by dedicated middleware, which can handle 
large messaging and security requirements while retaining the decoupled nature of the 
application.  
The communication paradigms employed in distributed systems are mainly built on 
transmission control protocol (TCP) [124], and include remote procedure call (RPC) 
[125], used for example in some applications of Enterprise JavaBeans (EJBs) [126], 
but mainly use asynchronous messaging, and middleware functionalities such as 
message queuing and publish subscribe support, with push and pull capabilit ies.  
Message passing represents a low-level form of distributed communication. In this 
structure, participants communicate by simply sending and receiving messages. The 
producer sends messages asynchronously through a communication channel 
(previously set up for communication). The consumer receives messages by listening 
synchronously on that channel. The producer and consumer are coupled in both time 
and space. Message passing is nowadays viewed as primitive to build complex 
interaction schemes and it is rarely used directly [16].  
RPC is a widely used form of distributed interaction proposed in [10, 11, 126] for 
procedural languages, and in object-oriented contexts for remote method invocations. 
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It is, for example, used in Java Remote Method Invocation (R MI) [12, 126], Common 
Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) [13, 14], Microsoft Distributed 
Component Object Model (DCOM) [67]. In RPC and its derivatives, the producer 
performs a synchronous call, which is processed asynchronously by the consumer. 
RPC makes remote interactions appear almost the same way as local interactions.  
In contrast to the RPC method that is invocation centric, message queuing [15] and 
publisher/subscribe  are message centric communication schemes. Message queuing 
and publish/subscribe are tightly intertwined paradigms. Message queuing 
middleware buffers the produced messages in a queue while supporting, when 
required, reliable delivery, transactional and ordering guarantees [16]. In practice, 
based upon the messaging order, the queue can be specified as First-In-First-Out 
(FIFO), Last-In-First-Out (LIFO), limited FIFO, and limited LIFO. As the name 
suggests, FIFO/LIFO means the first/last arrived message will be served first while 
the limited ones introduce the priority concept, which means that the message with 
higher priority will be severed earlier than those with lower priority. Typically, the 
limited FIFO message queue is the most widely used queue model in MOM 
applications. The message queuing paradigm is used to support a point-to-point model 
where messages are addressed to recipients. This message queuing paradigm is 
suitable for the request/reply message exchange pattern. A message queue has various 
properties: private or shared, durable or transient, permanent or temporary. If a client 
application creates a message queue, it can select some important properties: name (if 
applications want to share a message queue, they need to agree on a queue name 
beforehand); durable (if the queue is declared as non-durable, the message will be lost 
when the server restarts); auto-delete (if specified, the server will delete the message 
queue when all clients have finished using it).  
When a user application wants to transfer data to another application, it puts data into 
messages, and then puts the messages onto a queue (or publishes them with a topic). 
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Then there are four main ways the messages can be retrieved: Another application on 
this computer (or another part of the same application) retrieves the messages from 
the same queue where they were put. A queue manager is configured to send the 
messages through a channel over the network to a remote queue on a queue manager 
on another computer. An application on that computer retrieves the messages from the 
remote queue. An application on another computer pulls the messages across the 
network when it needs them. A queue manager sends the published message to a 
subscribe application.  
Figure 2-1Example of a Message Queuing system [66] 
Figure 2-1 is an example of a Message Queue system. In a Message Queue system, 
users can have many queues and topics on one queue manager and they can also have 
more than one queue manager on one computer. A computer with a client installation 
with no queue manager is allowed as well. The client uses the queue manager on a 
server installation on another computer for messaging. 
The publish/subscribe  paradigm is used to support a many-to-many model that 
permits an efficient dissemination of messages across a distributed system [17]. 
Application clients in a publish/subscribe structure can be a publisher (the message 
source) or a subscriber (the message receiver). In publish/subscribe, the middleware 
keeps the registered interests of consumers according to the topic (for topic-based 
publisher/subscriber) or matching conditions defined by consumers (content-based 
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publisher/subscriber); and delivers a message to all consumers that match with their 
registered interests. The topic-based publish/subscribe variant represents a static 
schema which offers only limited expressiveness since the pre-defined external 
criterion the topic name cannot be changed. A content based publisher/subscriber 
classifies message according to the properties of the message itself. So a 
content-based publisher/subscriber could be more flexible [16].  
 
Figure 2-2 Publish-subscribe system model example  
Figure 2-2 shows an example of a MOM system based on a publish/subscribe 
structure. Brokers are inter-connected through an overlay network and collectively 
provide the publish/subscribe messaging service. Each endpoint node, such as a 
sensor, an actuator or a processing element, is attached to a local broker [2]. There 
can be an arbitrary number of topics in the system. Each endpoint can publish and 
subscribe to one or many topics, while each broker can perform publish/subscribe 
matching, transport messages to local endpoints or neighbouring brokers, and 
optionally perform message mediation.  
Using this style of interaction, the sender does not know the identity of the receivers: 
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it is the dispatcher, which is a function existing in the broker that identifies them 
dynamically. As a consequence, new components can join a federation, become 
immediately active, and cooperate with the others without requiring any 
reconfiguration of the architecture. Due to this advantage structure, MOMs could 
provide a service that allows content providers and consumers to concentrate on the 
production and consumption of transmitted information. The key advantage of the 
MOM architecture is that it reduces the number of point-to-point connections in a 
complex business critical information technology (IT) system [127].  
2.2 Implementations of MOM Systems 
A MOM system can be divided into two categories, one in topic based system and 
another is content based system. This research focuses on the topic-based 
publisher/subscriber paradigm, which is the most commonly used in enterprise 
applications. Examples on both the topic based and content based systems will be 
given.  
2.2.1 The Java Message Service (JMS) 
The Java message service is an application programming interface (API) provided by 
Sun Microsystems (now Oracle) as described in [24, 25, 26, 27]. In practice, the JMS 
framework defines the system as a set of non-implemented Java methods such as 
interfaces and abstract methods, where the specific implementations are up to a 
vendor. 
The API defines Java interfaces for the publishers allowing them to generate and send 
messages to the JMS server. For the subscriber side, the defined Java interfaces 
consider the reception of these messages from the JMS server. The API provides 
abstract Java methods to control the message flow by various message filtering 
options. The JMS server itself, which represents the mediation server, is not specified 
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by the API and its implementation is up to a vendor, as well as the underlying 
communication mechanisms between publishers and subscribers. In this context the 
replication grade describes (defined below) the number of messages which have to be 
transmitted to the subscribers by the JMS server for a single published message. In 
this section, the JMS framework and the most important features provided by the JMS 
API are described.  
The JMS is a wide-spread and frequently used middleware technology. Therefore, lots 
of systems are based on it, such as FioranMQ [28], TibcoEMS [29], WebSphereMQ 
[30, 68, 69, 70] and RabbitMQ [31]. The RabbitMQ software fully supports the 
Advanced Message Queuing Protocols (AMQP) framework while being based on the 
JMS framework. However, the content based systems are more complex and less 
popular than topic based system. So this research will mainly verify pure topic based 
system.  
After discussing the state-of-the-art MOM systems, the following sections will 
introduce well-known MOM system protocols, part of which will be verified later in 
this thesis.  
2.2.2 Apache Qpid 
AMQP is one of the most popular protocols used in MOM systems. It is an open, 
royalty-free and unpatented networking protocol for MOMs. The AMQP Working 
Group aims to create a de-facto standard protocol for MOMs that allows the business 
applications to interact [21, 22, 23] encouraging the ideas of partnership and 
collaboration. One of the implementations of AMQP recommended in [21] is Apache 
Qpid (Open Source AMQP Messaging). In Qpid, there are procedures to react to 
broker failure and also to adding/deleting a publisher or subscriber and for matching 
topics.  
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An exchange  accepts messages from a producer application and routes them to 
message queues according to prearranged criteria. These criteria are called ‘bindings’. 
Exchanges are matching and routing engines. That is, they inspect messages and by 
using their binding tables, decide how to forward these messages to message queues. 
Exchanges never store messages. AMQP defines a number of standard exchange 
types, which cover the fundamental types of routing needed to do common message 
delivery. Exchanges may be durable, transient, or auto-deleted. Durable exchanges 
last until they are deleted. Transient exchanges last until the server shuts down. 
Auto-deleted exchanges last until they are no longer used [22, 23].  
In the general case, an exchange examines a message's properties, its header fields, 
and its body content, and using this and possibly data from other sources, decides how 
to route the message. In the majority of simple cases, the exchange examines a single 
key field, which is called the ‘routing key’. The routing key is a virtual address that 
the exchange may use to decide how to route the message. For topic based 
publish/subscribe routing, the routing key is the topic hierarchy value. In more 
complex cases, the routing may be based on message header fields and/or the message 
body [22, 23].  
The topic exchange process performs the following steps: 
1. A message queue is bound to the exchange using a binding key, K.  
2. A publisher sends to the exchange a message with the routing key R.  
3. The message is passed to the all message queues where K matches R.  
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2.2.3 The Harmony MOM System-An Example of a 
Publish/Subscribe MOM System 
When a topic-based publish/subscribe structure is put into practice, a programming 
abstraction is introduced to map individual topics to distinguish communication 
channels. The topic name is usually specified as an initialization argument. Every 
topic is viewed as an event service of its own, identified by a unique name. Usually 
the wildcards are also allowed in the topic name by most of the MOM systems. For 
example, in TIBCO Rendezvous [9], a topic name with wildcards, which offers the 
possibility to subscribe and publish to several topics whose names match a given set 
of keywords, like an entire subtree or a specific level in a hierarchy. IBM T. J. 
Watson Research Centre has developed a MOM system called Harmony [44] and this  
MOM system is also a topic based publish/subscribe paradigm. This thesis use 
Harmony system as an example to introduce publisher/subscriber structure based 
MOM system. 
Publish/Subscribe Structure 
In Harmony, it assumed that a set of brokers is known in advance, and the topology of 
the broker overlay is also known. This assumption is reasonable in many application 
scenarios because the broker deployment only changes at very coarse timescales (e.g. 
once in a few weeks).  
Harmony assumes that the endpoint nodes in the system are clustered into many local 
domains, and there is one broker node inside each domain. As shown in Figure 2-2, 
each endpoint node, such as a sensor, a publisher, a subscriber, an actuator or a 
processing element, is attached to the local broker. There can be an arbitrary number 
of topics in the system, which can be defined either through administrative tools or 
dynamically using programming APIs. Each endpoint can publish and subscribe to 
one or multiple topics, while each broker can perform publish/subscribe matching, 
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transport messages to local endpoints by looking up the local subscription table or 
neighbouring brokers by looking up the remote subscription table, and optionally 
performing message mediation (e.g., format transformation)[2]. 
So communication is usually asynchronous and communicating endpoints/clients are 
decoupled in time (they do not have to be active at the same time), space (they do not 
need to know each other) and flow (the sending and receiving of messages does not 
block participants) [18, 19]. Clients/endpoints do not even need to know the existence 
of each other.  
Adding or Deleting a Publisher / Subscriber in Harmony 
In the Harmony model, each endpoint has a local broker. The endpoint can subscribe 
to any topic at any time and they can just send those subscriptions to the local broker. 
Each broker collects the subscriptions and maintains a so called ‘local subscription 
table’ to record which topics each local endpoint subscribes to. Then the brokers 
propagate the topics to other brokers. So, every broker knows other broker needs and 
maintains those information in a so called ‘remote subscription table’. In this structure, 
adding or deleting publishers will not affect both the ‘local subscription table’ and the 
‘remote subscription table’, so there is no need to have measures to deal with it. If a 
subscriber is added or deleted, the local broker will firstly update the ‘local 
subscription table’ and then check whether there is a change in the variety of topic. If 
there is a change in topic (e.g. subscribes to more or less topics), the local broker 
propagates the change to other brokers. Then other brokers update their ‘remote 
subscription table’ [2].  
If a publisher publishes a topic, says T, the topic is firstly sent to t he local broker. The 
local broker checks the local subscription table and sends T to those local endpoints 
who are interested in T. Then the local broker checks the remote subscription table to 
find all remote brokers that subscribe to T and sends T to the m. As long as they 
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receive T, they pass T to their local endpoints who subscribed to T. At the end, the 
message eventually arrives at all subscribers of topic T in the system.  
Detecting a Broker Failure and Monitoring the Link-State 
Harmony uses similar methods to open shortest path first (OSPF) [71, 72]. Brokers in 
Harmony keep periodically advertising its link states, including the measured 
processing latency for each topic and the network latency to each of its neighbours. 
Through this simple neighbouring forwarding mechanism, every broker in this model 
maintains an entire network map with all the link states. Also there are monitoring 
agents for every broker. Those monitoring agents measure the processing and network 
latencies and periodically ping neighbouring brokers to gain the network latency. This  
Harmony model computes an Exponentially Weighted Moving Averaging (EWMA) 
[128] to avoid sudden spikes and drops in the measurements [2].  
To detect the failure of brokers, Harmony assumes that if a neighbouring broker fails 
to reply to three consecutive pings, it is regarded as failed and the link latency is 
marked as ∞. The broker failure will be broadcasted to all the brokers and they will 
update their remote subscription table. Also the monitoring agents will keep track of 
the broker processing latency. If they find a high latency on a publish/subscribe 
matching or the queuing delay, they will arrange part of the publishers and the 
subscribers linked to the delayed broker to a new broker, in order to decrease the load. 
Also the new arrangement will be broadcasted to help the brokers to update their 
subscription tables [2].  
2.3 Overlay Network Fast Recovery 
Overlay network recovery exists in conjunction with recovery in the underlay. One of 
the most wildly used network routing protocols is OSPF and this will be looked at 
first.  
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2.3.1 IP Fast Recovery Scheme 
In OSPF adjacent routers periodically exchange Hello messages to maintain the link 
adjacency. If a router does not receive a Hello message from its neighbour within  a 
RouterDeadInterval (typically 40 seconds or 4 HelloIntervals), it assumes the link 
between itself and the neighbour to be down and generates a new Router LSA to 
reflect the changed topology. All such LSAs, generated by the routers affected by the 
failure, are flooded throughout the network and cause the routers in the network to 
undertake the shortest path first (SPF) calculation and update the next hop 
information in the forwarding table. Thus, the time required to recover from the 
failure consists of: (1) the failure detection time (2) LSA flooding time (3) the time to 
complete the new SPF calculations and update the forwarding tables. Goyal et al 
[105], focus on reducing the failure detection time, which is clearly the main 
component of the overall failure recovery time in OSPF-based networks. While the 
availability of link layer notifications can help achieve fast failure detection, such 
mechanisms are often not available. Hence, the routers use the Hello protocol to 
detect the loss of adjacency with a neighbour. However, there is a limit to which the 
HelloInterval can be safely reduced. As the HelloInterval becomes smaller, there is an 
increased chance that the network congestion will lead to loss of several consecutive 
Hello messages and thereby cause a false breakdown of the adjacency between 
routers even though the routers and the link between them are functioning perfectly 
well.  
Goyal et al. [105] examine the network wide impact of reducing the HelloInterval in 
terms of number of false alarms under a realistic model of network congestion. They 
quantify the detrimental effect of these false alarms in terms of unnecessary SPF 
calculations done by the routers. They examine how the network topology influences 
the occurrence of false alarms. Finally, they evaluate how much faster detection of 
network failures helps in achieving faster recovery from these failures in the operation 
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of OSPF networks.  
They found that when traffic in the network is heavy, a smaller HelloInterval may 
lead to fake of link failures [105, 129] (i.e. false positives). Conversely, if traffic is 
quite light and fast, the HelloInterval could be reduced to milliseconds, while the 
OSPF schema only allows a second to be the smallest time measurement. So, we 
propose an idea of adjusting the panic timer, which will increase robustness of a 
mission critical MOM system.  
Goyal et al. [105] proposed the optimal value for the HelloInterval that will lead to 
fast failure detection in the network whilst keeping the occurrence of false alarms 
within acceptable limits. However, with the minimum size of a HelloInterval 
expressed in ‘seconds’, the minimum detection time will be 4 seconds. For a mission 
critical MOM application, a delay of 4 seconds will still be unacceptable.  
Delay time in OSPF includes the failure detection time, event propagation time, 
Shortest Path First algorithm running time and the Routing Information Base (RIB) 
[130] or forwarding information base (FIB) [131] update time. Normally, the ‘event 
propagation time’ includes Link-state advertisement (LSA) generation delay, LSA 
reception delay, Processing Delay, and Packet Propagation Delay [132].  
Processing Delay is the amount of time it takes the router to put the LSA on the 
outgoing flood lists. This delay could be significa nt if SPF process starts before 
flooding the LSA. SPF runtime is not the only contributor to the processing delay, but 
it’s the one you have control over. If you configured SPF throttling to be fast enough 
(see next session) – the exact time varies but mainly the initial delays below than 
40ms – it may happen so that SPF run occurs before the triggering LSA is flooded to 
neighbours. This will result in slower flooding process. For faster convergence, it is 
required that LSAs are always flooded prior to SPF run. ISIS process in Cisco IOS 
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[133] supports the command fast-flood, which ensures the LSPs are flooded ahead of 
running SPF, irrespective of the initial SPF delay. On the contrary, OSPF does not 
support this feature and the only option (at the moment) is properly tuning SPF 
runtime delays [101]. The Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm running time is bounded 
by   logO L N N   where N  is number of the nodes and L is the number of 
the links in a topology under consideration [122, 123]. For a 24 nodes network, the 
SPF running time delay is about 32ms [101]. There is more quantifiable experiment  
which has been done by Cisco researchers where they claimed the time required to do 
shortest path calculation: observed to be 
20.00000247 0.000978x    seconds on 
Cisco 3600 series routers. In this equation, x  is the number of nodes in the 
topology [102]. 
After completing SPF computation, OSPF performs sequential RIB update to reflect 
the changed topology. The RIB updates are further propagated to the FIB table – 
based on the platform architecture this could be either centralized or distributed 
process. The RIB/FIB update process may contribute the most to the convergence 
time in the topologies with a large amount of prefixes, e.g. thousands or tens of 
thousands. In such networks, updating RIB and distributed FIB databases on 
line-cards may take considerable amount of time, such as at the order of tens if not 
hundreds of milliseconds (varies depending on the platform).  
2.3.2 Resilient Routing Layers Algorithm 
The authors in [110] have proposed an alternative solution for fast recovery from link 
failures called Resilient Routing Layers (RRL). RRL [134, 135, 136, 137] is based on 
the idea of building spanning sub topologies over the full network topology, and using 
these sub topologies to forward traffic in the case of a failure. Routing recovered 
traffic according to a sub topology may cause a high concentration of traffic on 
certain links, and hence a loss of some of the recovery gains due to link congestion 
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[111].  
The authors of RRL proposed to organize a network topology in sub-topologies called 
routing layers. In each layer there are some nodes or areas that do not carry transit 
traffic, and the authors called these nodes or areas the safe nodes of this layer. Layers 
are constructed so that all nodes are present in each layer, and there exists a path 
between all node pairs in each layer. Each node should be safe in at least one layer to 
guarantee single node fault tolerance. There are numerous ways to construct the layers 
so that different protection properties are optimized [112, 113, 114]. 
This RRL schema ensures all node-pairs can communicate with each other in all 
layers, and also that safe nodes will not carry any transit traffic, only traffic 
originating and terminating in the safe nodes: 
1) Links haven’t been chosen as safe links, which are directly connected to a safe 
node, can carry all kinds of traffic originated and terminated anywhere.  
2) Links which are chosen to be safe link can only be used as the first hop or last hop 
of the communication. 
Traffic originated in a safe node can use a safe link as first hop, and that traffic 
terminated in a safe node can use a safe link as last hop towards the safe node.  
Although, the RRL scheme saves memory by storing fewer routing tables, it does not 
guarantee the shortest paths are used, which can be critical for a time-sensitive 
overlay network. Normally one hop in an overlay network could be a relatively long 
way in the underlay network. The shorter a path is the better.  More overlay hops 
may correspond to a much longer geographical distance in the underlying network. 
Therefore, this research proposes to perform all the time consuming calculations 
Message Oriented Middleware Systems and Overlay Networks for Fast Recovery 
 
34 
 
before the overlay network is operational. Moreover, this research provides a novel 
idea of condensing all the pre-calculated routing tables into one super routing table. 
So this approach will save quite a lot of space for a broker.  
2.4 A Summary of the State-of-the-Art on MOM Systems 
and Network Fast Recovery 
Existing MOMs fall into one of two categories: enterprise messaging systems and 
real-time messaging systems. Intended to address traditional business needs, 
enterprise messaging systems provide message delivery assurance and transactional 
guarantees. They usually implement the JMS standard [24] and can transport 
messages over a wide area across multiple domains. However, they do not proactively 
manage messaging performance. As such, applications cannot predict or depend on 
when messages will arrive at the destination. Real-time messaging systems, on the 
other hand, offer quality of service (QoS) assurance by allocating resources and 
scheduling messages based on application-specific QoS objectives. They often 
conform to the Data Distribution Service (DDS) standard [73].  
AMQP is continually updated and version 1.0 (is a standard accepted by Organization 
for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) [138], which is a 
global consortium which drives the development, convergence, and adoption of 
e-business and web service standards. Cisco, JPMorgan Chase, Red Hat together with 
other 5 companies join in the development of AMQP uses cases. Winter Green’s 2008  
annual report indicated that IBM WebSphere holds 64% of users in message oriented 
middleware market [98]. Nowadays, AMQP is chasing up IBM WebSphere and lots  
of successful use cases based on AMQP such as Qpid and Rabbit are taking over the 
market shares from WebSphere. One of the implementations of AMQP recommended 
in its site is Apache Qpid (Open Source AMQP Messaging). In Qpid, there are 
measures to react the broker failure and for adding/deleting a publisher/subscriber and 
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also a procedure of matching topics. 
The message queuing paradigm is used to support a point-to-point model where 
messages are addressed to recipients. This message queuing paradigm is suitable for 
the request/reply message exchange pattern and it is more reliable than the 
publish/subscribe paradigm. So, many message services of banks and other finical 
enterprises are based on the message queuing paradigm. However, message queuing 
paradigm does not have the characteristic of scalability. The publish/subscribe 
paradigm is used to support a many-to-many model that permits an efficient 
dissemination of messages across a distributed system. This kind of many-to-many 
model has higher scalability for large systems.  
Message queuing middleware buffers the produced messages in a queue while 
supporting, when required, reliable delivery, transactional and ordering guarantees. A 
publish/subscribe middleware keeps the registered interests of consumers according to 
topics (for topic-based publish/subscribe) or matching conditions defined by 
consumers (for content-based publish/subscribe); and delivers a message to all 
consumers that match with their registered interests. Message queuing systems 
usually integrate publish/subscribe support inherently. Message Oriented Middleware 
adopts the message centric approaches and usually employs both message queuing 
and publish/subscribe communication schemes. Nowadays, since IBM WebSphere 
MQ has the longest history, it has already integrated message broker service into its 
products in its newest version – version 7.0. Most of the rest commercial MOM 
applications are employing both message queuing and message broker paradigms.  
Quite a few proposals have been made to handle link failures as locally as possible, 
by only doing routing updates in a limited number of routers near the failure [106]. 
These proposals suggested that if two equal cost paths exist toward a destination, 
traffic can safely be switched from one to the other in case of a failure. Iselt et al. [107] 
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suggest using Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) tunnels to make sure that there 
are always are two equal cost paths toward a destination at every node. There are 
other proposals that consider things globally as well, and try to guarantee that there 
always is a valid routing entry for a given destination after a single failure. With 
O2-routing [108], the routing tables are set up so that there is always two valid next 
hops toward a destination. However, they do not guarantee the shortest path. 
Conversely, Hansen et al. [109] proposed that for a network topology, there could be 
several layers with different safe nodes and safe links. Most nodes and links will only 
appear in one layer. As long as the failure is confined to a particular layer, the cost of 
all the links within this layer will be set to infinite and routing is performed via other 
layers. Therefore, each node just needs to store routing tables for the normal situation 
and for a single complete failure situation in each layer.  
The two schemes listed in section 2.3 are among the most popular IP network fast 
recovery measurements. Although, the IP fast recovery schema applied on OSPF 
network, reduces the failure detection time to a certain degree [105], the time for 
regenerating routing tables under a failure situation still remaining the same. The 
resilient routing layers algorithms, such as RRL, can save the time for regenerating 
new routing tables. However the RRL algorithm will not guarantee the shortest path 
any more when a failure happened and a pre-stored routing table is used. Moreover, 
the total number of routing tables a node needs to store is depending on the number of 
safe layers there are for a given topology. There is a trade-off between the number of 
safe layers and average path length. The more layers there are, the more likely a path 
is the shortest path [111]. So, this thesis proposes a novel algorithm for a 
pre-calculated routing table to reduce the time of regenerating new routing tables and 
condense all routing tables into one super routing table. 
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3 Logic Checking and Model Checking 
Tools 
3.1 Model Checking 
Model checking is an automatic technique for verifying finite-state reactive systems, 
such as sequential circuit designs and communication protocols. Specifications are 
expressed in temporal logic, and a reactive system can be modelle d as a state 
transition graph. An efficient search procedure is used to determine whether or not the 
state transition graph satisfies the specifications [32, 42, 43, 141].  
There are several advantages in using the model checking technique. The most 
important one is that the procedure is highly automatic. Typically, the user provides a 
high level representation of the model and the specification to be checked. The model 
checker will either terminate with the answer ‘true’, indicating that the model satisfies  
the specification, or it will give a counter example execution that shows why and 
where the formula failed by extensive simulations.  
To be more specific, model checking works starting with a model described by the 
user, and discovers whether hypotheses asserted by the user are valid on the model. If 
they are not, it can produce counter examples, consisting of execution traces. 
Furthermore, model checking focuses explicitly on temporal properties and the 
temporal evolution of systems.  
Model checking is based on temporal logic. The idea of temporal logic is that a 
formula is not statically true or false in a model, as it is in propositional and predicate 
logic. Instead, the models of temporal logic contain several states and a formula can 
be true in some states and false in others.  
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Therefore, there is no static truth anymore and this one is replaced by a dynamic one, 
in which the formulas may change their truth values as the system is changing from 
state to state. In model checking, the models M are transition systems and the 
properties φ are formulas in temporal logic [142]. To verify that a system satisfies a 
property, the following three things should be done: 
1. Model the system using the description language of a model checker, arriving at a 
model M; 
2. Code the property using the specification language of the model checker, resulting 
in a temporal logic formula φ;  
3. Run the model checker with inputs M and φ. 
The model checker outputs the answer ‘yes’ if M |= φ  (means the model M matching 
the formula φ), and ‘no’ otherwise; in the latter case, most model checkers also 
produce a trace of system behaviour which causes this failure. The value of the 
counterexample helps to detect the potential problems of the system and the collision 
or violation of the protocol.  
However, earlier model checkers could only check small circuits and protocols [33, 
34, 35]. They were not able to deal with large systems because of the state explosion 
problem [36]. With the help of an Ordered Binary Decision Diagram (OBDD) the 
capability of a model checker can be increased dramatically [37]. OBDD can 
effectively reduce useless states. So the number of nodes in the OBDDs that must be 
constructed no longer depends on the actual number of states or the size of the 
transition relations. With this great breakthrough, a number of major companies 
including Intel, Motorola, Fujitsu and AT&T have started using symbolic model 
checkers to verify actual circuits and protocols [32]. 
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The original model checking algorithm together with the new representation (using 
OBDD) for translation relation, is called Symbolic Model Checking.  
3.1.1 New Symbolic Model Checker—NuSMV 
NuSMV is a symbolic model checker developed by ITC-IRST and UniTN with the 
collaboration of CMU and UniGE [38].The NuSMV project aims at the development 
of a state-of-the-art model checker that is robust, open and customizable; it can be 
applied in technology transfer projects and can be used as research tool in different 
domains [38, 41, 143, 144].  
NuSMV provides a language for describing a model and it directly checks the validity 
of LTL which will be introduced in Chapter 3.2.1 (and also CTL) formulas on those 
models. NuSMV takes as input a text consisting of a program describing a model and 
some specifications (temporal logic formulas). It produces as output either the word 
‘true’ if the specifications hold, or a trace showing why the specification is false for 
the model represented by the program. A NuSMV program consists one or more 
modules. Just like in the programming language C, or Java, one of the modules must 
be called main. Modules can declare variables and assign values to them. 
Assignments usually give the initial value of a variable and its next value as an 
expression in terms of the current values of variables. This expression can be 
non-deterministic (denoted by several expressions in traces or no assignment at all). 
Non-determinism is used to model the environment and for abstraction.  
The following are two examples of NuSMV modules to illustrate the basic structure 
of a NuSMV file. 
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The program has two variables, request of type Boolean and states, which is the 
enumeration type {ready, busy}. The initial and subsequent values of the variable 
request are not determined within this program; this conservatively models these 
values by an external environment. This under specification of request implies that 
the value of variable states  is partially determined: initially, it is ready; and it 
becomes busy whenever request is true. If request is false, can be represented as ‘￢
req’ or req  (in Figure 3-1). In the later chapter (chapter 4) will use ‘ variable ’to 
indicate ‘not’ or ‘false’. The next value of states  is not determined. Note that ‘case 1’ 
in the program signifies the default case, and that case statements are evaluated from 
the top down. If several expressions to the left of a ‘:’ are true, then the command 
corresponding to the first, top-most true expression will be executed. The program 
therefore denotes the transition system as shown in Figure 3-1: 
MODULE main 
 
VAR 
  request : Boolean;  
  states   : {ready, busy}; 
ASSIGN 
  init(state) := ready; 
  next(state) := case 
    state = ready & request = TRUE  : busy;  
    TRUE                       :{ready,busy}; 
    esac; 
LTLSPEC 
  G(request -> F & state = busy) 
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Figure 3-1 The Model Corresponding to the NuSMV Program in the Text. 
There are four possible states, each one corresponding to a possible value of the two 
binary variables (as ‘request’ is a Boolean value which has two options ‘TRUE’ or 
‘FALSE’ and ‘states’ is a state variable which also has two options ‘ready’ or ‘busy’). 
Note that ‘busy’ is a shorthand for ‘state=busy’ and ‘req’ for ‘request is true.’ Since 
variable request functions as a genuine environment in this model, the program and 
the transition system are non-deterministic: i.e., the ‘next state’ is not uniquely 
defined. Any state transition based on the behaviour of states  comes in a pair: to a 
successor state where ‘request’ is false, or true, respectively. For example, the state 
‘￢req, busy’ has four states it can move to (itself and three others).  
 LTL (which will be introduced later on) specifications are introduced by the 
keyword LTLSPEC and are simply LTL formulas.  
The code and Figure 3-2 show a small example that models a broker’s working state 
as ‘working’ when the broker=TRUE and as ‘failed’ when the broker=FALSE.  
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The program has one variable named ‘broker’ of type Boolean. The initial value of 
‘broker’ is FALSE and subsequent values of ‘broker’ will be the reverse of current 
value. 
 
Figure 3-2Broker State Transition Diagram 
This ‘broker’ module could be a useful example of ‘broker state’ and will be used 
later on in Chapter 5.  
 
3.2 Temporal Logic 
Typically, temporal logic is used for reasoning about things that change over time 
[145,146]. This kind of logic was developed because of the limitation of predicate 
MODULE main 
VAR 
  broker :Boolean; 
ASSIGN 
  init(broker) := FALSE;  
  next(broker) := !broker; 
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logic. Predicate logic, also called the first-order-logic, can deal quiet satisfactorily 
with sentence components like ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, and ‘if…then’. The predicate logic 
assumes that a true statement is always true and a false statement is always false. 
However, when it comes to the modifiers like ‘eventually…’, ‘among…’ and 
‘only…’ first-order-logic cannot represent those modifiers with ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’ or 
‘if... then’ [39]. With the help of temporal logic, conditions that change over time can 
be represented, e.g. ‘I will be hungry eventually ’.  
There are several types of temporal logic, like the Computation Tree Logic (CTL), the 
Alternating-time Logic (ATL) [48], Timed CTL [49, 50], Linear-time Logic (LTL), 
and the ‘Until’-only fragment of Linear-time Logic (μTL) to name just a few. These 
kinds of temporal logic could be divided into two categories, one is called ‘linear-time 
logic’, which thinks time as a set of paths and a path is a sequence of time instances. 
The other is called ‘branching-time logic’ , which represents time as a tree, rooted at 
the present moment and branching out into the future. Branching-time logic seems to 
make the non-deterministic nature of the future more explicit. Linear-time temporal 
logic and computation tree logic will be used in this thesis. 
3.2.1 The LTL 
The Linear-time temporal logic is a temporal logic with connectives that allow one to 
refer to the future. It models time as a sequence of states, extending infinitely into the 
future. This sequence of states is sometimes called a computation path, or just a path. 
In general, the future is not determined, and every state has a unique successor, any 
one of which might be the ‘actual’ future that is realized. [39]  
In LTL, the connectives X, F, G, U, R and W are called ‘temporal connectives’. X 
means ‘neXt state’, F means ‘some Future state’, and G means ‘all future states’ 
(Globally). The next three, U, R and W are called ‘Until’, ‘Release’ and ‘Weak-until’. 
Following are some commonly used LTL formulas.  
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X p:this formula will be true if p is true in the second state of the path: 
 
Figure 3-3 LTL Formula ‘X p’ 
Figures of the rest formulas will be found in Appendix A. 
F p: this formula will be true if p eventually become true.  
G p: this formula will be true if p is true at every state.  
p U q: this formula will be true if p is always true until q is true. 
3.2.2 The CTL 
The Computation Tree Logic, CTL for short, is branching-time logic, meaning that its 
model of time is a tree-like structure in which the future is not determined; there are 
different paths in the future, any one of which might be the ‘actual’ path that is 
realized [33].  
Note that each of the CTL temporal connectives is a pair of symbols. The first part of 
a pair is composed of A or E. A means ‘along All paths’ (inevitably) and E means 
‘along at least (there Exist) one path’ (possibly). The second part of the pair is 
composed of X, F, G, or U, meaning ‘neXt state’, ‘some Future state’, ‘all future 
states’ (Globally) and Until, respectively. In CTL, pairs of symbols like EU are 
indivisible. Notice that AU and EU are binary. The symbols X, F, G and U cannot 
occur without being preceded by an A or/ and E; similarly, every A and E must have 
X, or F, or G or U to accompany it. 
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Following are examples of CTL formulas. The topmost state satisfies a given formula 
if the black states satisfy p and the shadow states satisfy formula q. 
AG p: in all paths, p is true all the time  
AF p: in every path, p will finally be true  
 
        Figure 3-4 CTL Formula ‘AG p’[32]             Figure 3-5 CTL Formula ‘AF p’[32]  
Figures of the remaining formulas can be found in Appendix A. 
AX p: for all paths, p will be true in next state  
p AU q: for all paths, p is true until q is true  
EG p: there is at least one path in which p will be true all the time  
EF p: there is at least one path in which p will finally be true 
EX p: there is at least one path in which p is true in next state 
p EU q: there is at least one path in which p is true until q is true  
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3.3 Concluding Remarks 
A publish/subscribe based MOM system could be hard to test and reason about. Using 
a model checker to formally model a MOM system could facilitate the research.  
Model checking is an automatic technique for verifying finite-state reactive systems. 
It is an attractive alternative to formal reasoning a MOM system. The user provides a 
high level representation of the model and the specification written with temporal 
logic formula to be checked. A model checker finds bugs in systems by exploring all 
possible execution states of a finite state model to search for violations of some 
desired property. The model checker will either terminate with the answer ‘true’ or 
provide a counter example. This chapter gives a brief introduction of one model 
checker NuSMV. 
In this research two temporal logics are used: Linear Tree Logic and Computation 
Tree Logic. These two temporal logics meet the need of the verifications in this 
research. In Appendix B, a comparison between LTL and CTL is presented to justify 
the necessity of using both of them in this research. 
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4 Verification Languages and Techniques 
While model checking is a powerful technique, one of the stumbling blocks to using it 
is the creation of appropriate finite state models for the systems being checked. Since 
most software systems have infinite-states, one must first find suitable abstractions 
that reduce the system to a finite state model, without eliminating the class of errors 
that one wants to pinpoint.  
A model should capture the basic properties that must be considered in order to verify 
the behavioural specification (the so called atomic propositions). Furthermore, to 
make the verification simpler, the model should abstract away all the details that have 
no effect on the correctness with respect to the specification. 
4.1 End-to-End Verification of Network Reachability 
In the past few years, many researchers have attempted to address various challenges 
in network configuration. In [74, 75, 76], different techniques are presented to 
identify configuration conflicts between firewall and IPSec devices. Approaches for 
analyzing routing configuration using static or formal analysis [60, 61, 62, 77, 78], 
and on-line debugging [8] was proposed. Top-down configuration approaches have 
also been proposed [79]. E. Al-Shaer et al. [7] presented a novel approach to model 
the global end-to-end behaviour of access control configuration of an entire network. 
The model represents the network as a finite state machine where the packet header 
and location determine the state. And also the packet header information determines 
the whole transitions for a packet. Inside the packet header, there is information on 
the packet source IP address, packet destination address, and packet current location. 
The policies for each device are also being modelled. It encodes the semantics of 
access control policies with Boolean functions. It uses a commercial model checking 
tool called ConfigChecker combined with CTL to test all future and past states of this 
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packet in the network and also verifies the network reachability and other security 
requirements. The research presented in this thesis extends the end-to-end verification 
proposed by E. Al-Shaer et al. and provides a way to verify a whole 
publisher/subscriber MOM system. The verification includes the checking of the 
reachability of different topics, the rules for regulating the working of the system, and 
checking the configuration and reconfiguration after a failure. The novelty of this 
work is the creation and the optimization of a symbolic model checker that abstracts 
the end-to-end network configuration behaviour and using it to verify reachability and 
security properties.  
The paper [7] shows that more than 62% of network failures today are due to network 
misconfiguration [8]. Also the paper indicates that with the increasing scale of 
network, it would be a numerous work to configure the network devices in isolation 
and it would be not possible to manually analyse the cooperation among those devises. 
However, people cannot foresee whether the entire network devices will perform 
correctly. If the isolated configured devices could not work along with others, 
network administrators have to wait until the network fails and explores the problem. 
Then the network administrator could reconfigure the whole system. However, they 
still will not know in advance whether this reconfiguration is successful or not.  
Paper [7] reports a method to solve this unpredictable configuration problem by using 
a NuSMV model checker to verify the reachability and the security of a network.  
4.1.1 Model Checking Example 
A model that represents a network as a finite state machine was proposed by [7]. In 
this model the header and location information of the message which belonging to a 
topic determine the state. Each device in the network can then be modelled by 
describing how it changes a packet that is currently located at the device. For example, 
a firewall might remove the packet from the network or it might allow it to move on 
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to the device on the other side of the firewall. A router might change the location of 
the packet but leave all the header information of the packet unchanged. A device 
performing network address translation might change the location of the packet as 
well as some of the IP header information. A hub might copy the same packet to 
multiple new locations. The behaviour of each of these devices can be described by a 
list of rules. Each rule has a condition and an action. The rule condition can be 
described using a Boolean formula over the bits of the state. If the packet at the device 
matches (satisfies) a rule condition, then the appropriate action is taken. As described 
above, the action could involve changing the packet location as well as changing IP 
header information. In all cases, however, the change can be described by a Boolean 
formula over the bits of the state. Sometimes the new values are constant (completely 
determined by the rule itself), and sometimes they may depend on the values of some 
of the bits in the current state. In either case, a transition relation can be constructed as 
a relation or characteristic function over two copies of the state bits. An assignment to 
the bits/variables in the transition relation yields true if the packet described by the 
first copy of the bits will be transformed into a packet described by the second copy 
of the bits when it is at the device in question.  
32-bits are used for the source IP address, the destination IP address, a nd the device 
currently processing the packet, with 16-bit source port number and destination port 
numbers in the basic network model of [7]. In order to illustrate this approach, an 
example containing only 2 bits for the source IP, destination IP, and location IP , and 1 
bit for the source port and destination port is given. The formulas use 1 1 1, ,s d l  for the 
higher order bit in the source IP address, the destination IP address, and the location 
of interested IP address respectively. 0 0 0, ,s d l are used for the lower order bits.  
' ' ' '
0 0 1 1, , , ...s d s d  represent the values of the bits in the next state with the same 
interpretation as the unprimed versions above.  
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The message header information determines the transitions for a message. For a 
message, the broker which publishes the message is the source, the broker which 
subscribes to this message is the destination. Inside the message header there is 
information giving the message source IP address, the destination address, and its 
current location. The rules for each device are also modelled in [7], but only set a 
router model as an example. 
A router might change the location of the packet but leave all the header information 
of the packet unchanged. The rule condition can be described using a Boolean 
formula over the bits of the state (the parameters of the characteristic function σ). As 
described above, the action could involve changing the packet location as well as 
changing IP header information. In all cases, however, the change can be described by 
a Boolean formula over the bits of the state. Sometimes the new values are constant 
(completely determined by the rule itself), and sometimes they may depend on the 
values of some of the bits in the current state. In either case, a transition relation can 
be constructed as a relation or characteristic function over two copies of the state bits. 
An assignment to the bits/variables in the transition relation yields true if the packet 
described by the first copy of the bits will be transformed into a packet described by 
the second copy of the bits when it is at the device in question. Some examples of 
how real devices can be encoded in this way should help to illustrate the technique. 
However, to keep the formulas simple, the examples will contain only 2 bits  for the 
source IP, destination IP, and location IP addresses, and 1 bit for the source port and 
destination port. Real examples are similar, but with larger (32-bit or 16-bit) fields.  
4.1.2 A Router Model 
To describe a router model, assume a router with IP address 3 sends all messages in 
different topics destined for IP addresses 1 and 0 (source) to IP address 0 (next hop), 
while all other topics are sent to IP address 2 as a default gateway.  
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The policy described above can be formulated as:  
' ' ' '
1 1 0 1 1 0
( ) ( )d l l d l l                  (4-1) 
Then all packets that satisfy the formula (4-1) will be forwarded to the outgoing 
interface. This formula (4-1) shows two possible situations at a broker. The first one 
is ' '
1 1 0
d l l  . In order to let this part to be ‘TRUE’, the destination 1d  should be 
true which means 
0d  could be 0 or 1 but 1d  could just be 0. Hence the destination 
would be 01 or 00. Also ' '
1 0
l l should be true , and that is to say '
1
l and '
0
l  are true 
at the same time ( '
1 0l   ,
'
0
0l  ). So for any topic which destination is 01 or 00, the 
next location will be 00. Otherwise, let the other situation ' '
1 1 0
d l l   to be true. 
Then it indicates that when the destination is 10 or 11, the next location will be 11.  
No packet header information changes. This condition can be formulated as:  
   ' '
{0,1, } {0,1, }i i i ii p i p
s s d d
 
              (4-2) 
This formula could be separated into two parts, divided by ‘  ’ and the two should be 
true at the same time then this formula can be true. The first part   '
{0,1, } i ii p
s s

   
means the next states of
0
s ,
1
s and ps will be themselves with no change. It is the 
same as the later part. That is to say, this formula indicates the packet header 
information will never change.  
Finally, this transformation only takes place when the packet is currently at the router. 
This condition can be formulated as:  
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1 0
l l             (4-3) 
This formula means the packet is in the location 10 (the router’s IP).  
For a simple model with several components (e.g. routers, sensors or other end nodes), 
using less than 5 Boolean variables to represent the IP addresses is feasible. However, 
in the real word, the IP addresses should be represented by 32 Boolean variables. If 
one designs a model using the IPv4 address structure, it will need up to 232 different 
states, which may lead to a state explosion. In [12], the authors’ propose a basic 
model that has five key identity variables; two of them (ports and port ids) are 16 bits 
long and the rest (IPsource, IPdestination and location) that are all 32 bits. In this 
model, there are thus 2128 possible states. In order to get rid of the state explosion 
problem, this research proposes another way to build an MOM overlay network 
model. Since the publish/subscribe system is an overlay network, the number of 
brokers is much less than the number of routers in its under layer network. In MOM 
models, it does not use 32-bit IP addresses. This research uses the nature numbers of 
IDs to handle the number of brokers. However, this research potentially needs 
policies for each topic and so the set of policies can be large.  
Although model checking is a powerful technique, creation of appropriate finite state 
models for the systems being checked is still one of the stumbling blocks to using it. 
An important challenge of this research is how to build feasible models of 
publish/subscribe based MOM overlay networks to reduce the system to a finite state 
model, without eliminating the class of errors that wanted to be checked. 
4.2 Model Checked Publish/Subscribe Systems 
Publish/subscribe systems are hard to reason about and to test. In particular, given the 
inherent non-determinism in the order of event receipt, delays in event delivery, and 
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variability in the timing of event announcements, the number of possible system 
executions becomes combinational large. There have been several attempts to develop 
formal foundations for specifying and reasoning about publish/subscribe systems [80, 
81, 82, 83, 84], and this area remains a fertile one for formal verification. 
Unfortunately, existing notations and methods are difficult to use in practice by 
non-formalists, and require considerable proof machinery to carry out.  
The key feature of [90] is a reusable, parameterized state machine model that captures 
publish/subscribe run-time event management and dispatch policy. Generation of 
models for specific publish/subscribe systems is then handled by a translation tool 
that accepts as input a set of publish/subscribe component descriptions together with a 
set of publish/subscribe properties, and maps them into the framework where they can 
be checked using off-the-shelf model checking tools.  
To further reduce costs of using a model checker,[90] also provides a tool that 
translates publish/subscribe application component descriptions (specified in an 
XML-like input language) and properties into the a lower-level form where they can 
be checked using standard model checking tools. 
Model checking of software systems [147, 148] is an extremely act ive area of 
research at present. Much of this effort aims to make model checking easy for 
practitioners to use, for example by allowing the input language to be a standard 
programming language (e.g., [85, 86]), and by providing higher-level languages for 
specifying properties to check (e.g., [87]). However, none of these efforts has focused 
on exploiting the regularities of one particular component integration architecture, as 
this research does for publish-subscribe systems.  
Finally, there have been severa l previous efforts at providing formal, checkable 
models for software architectures. Some of these even use model checkers (e.g., [88, 
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89]) to check properties of event-based systems. However, none has been tailored to 
the specific needs of publish/subscribe systems development.  
Authors of [90] believe that there are two main stumbling blocks to creating a state 
model for a publish/subscribe system that is suitable for model checking. One is the 
construction of finite-state approximations for each of the component behaviours 
(methods). Authors in [90] have adopted the following restrictions: all data has a 
finite range; the event alphabet and the set of components and bindings are fixed at 
runtime; there is a specified limit on the size of the event queue and on the length of 
event announcement history maintained by the dispatcher; and there is a limit on the 
size of invocation queues (pending method invocations as a result of event delivery).  
A second problem is the construction of the run-time apparatus that glues the 
components together, mediating their interaction via event announcements. This 
involves developing state machines that maintain pending event queues, enforce 
dispatch regimes (correctly modelling non-deterministic aspects of the dispatch), and 
providing shared variable access. In principle, this part of the modelling process could 
be done afresh for each system using brute force. Unfortunately modelling 
publish/subscribe systems involves a fair amount of such runtime state machinery, 
and is not trivial to get right. Moreover, once built, it is hard to experiment with 
alternative run time mechanisms。 
Model checking for Publish-Subscribe architectures [90] provides a set of pluggable 
modules that allow the modeller to choose one possible configuration out of a set of 
possible choices. However, available models are far from fully capturing the different 
characteristics of existing Publish-Subscribe systems. For instance, application 
components cannot change their subscriptions at run-time, and the message 
dispatching mechanism is only characterized in terms of delivery policy 
(asynchronous, synchronous, immediate or delayed). The same approach is extended 
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in [91] by adding more expressive events, dynamic delivery policies and dynamic 
event method bindings. These features are then used in [99] to implement a 
transformational framework that, starting from a dedicated programming language, 
produces Extensible Markup Language (XML) data for model checking as well as 
executable artefacts for testing. The resulting approach only deals with the 
specification of different delivery policies depending on the overall state of the model, 
and still does not capture fine-grained guarantees such as real-time constraints. 
4.3 Alternative Model Checking Language: Bogor 
Techniques applicable to specific Publish-Subscribe middleware systems have been 
considered in [92, 93, 94, 95]. Beek et al. [92] concentrate on the addition of a 
Publish-Subscribe notification service to an existing groupware protocol, and reports 
on the improvements in user awareness of the development status achieved in this 
way. Caporuscio et al. [93] develop a compositional reasoning technique based on an 
assume-guarantee methodology. The methodology is applied on a specific case study, 
i.e., on developing a file sharing system on top of the Siena Publish-Subscribe 
middleware [96]. The proposals in [94, 95] describe an approach similar to ours based 
on an early version of Bogor. The authors focus on modelling the real-time features of 
the CORBA Communication Model (CCM). Their time model is certainly more 
detailed than ours. All the aforementioned approaches lose generality in that they do 
not allow users to customize the checking engine to model Publish-Subscribe systems 
that provide various guarantees. 
The efficiency and correctness of a system is heavily dependent on its design rules 
and protocols. Model checking techniques are extensively used to find vulnerabilities 
in rules and protocols. So system designers can fix or overcome vulnerabilities before 
the system suffers any losses. For example, Kerberos is one of the most popular 
protocols for providing a secure communication over network. It was considered the 
most secure protocol. However, the authors in [40] found vulnerability in this 
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protocol by using a model checking technique.  
L.Baresi et al. [40] provide a novel approach based on Bogor for the accurate 
verification of applications based on Publish-Subscribe infrastructures.  
The paper reported by L.Baresi et al. could be divided into three parts. The first part 
tries to adopt standard model checking techniques to verify the application behaviour. 
The second part introduced Bogor, which is a state-of-the-art extensible model 
checker implemented in Java. The last part addresses an application for fire 
monitoring in a tunnel.  
Since a variety of applications build on Public-Subscribe infrastructures and they may 
have different requirements on the under layer, L.Baresi et al. focus on changing 
different verifications to meet the different requirements fr om the upper layer. The 
other useful paper [7] pays much more attention to the access control verification for 
network devices. Both papers provide the scenarios all of which applies to highly 
dynamic and flexible environments. So a reconfiguration of system is considered in 
both papers.  
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter focuses on comparing the state-of-the-art with this research. Since 
configuring a network is time consuming and error prone, some researchers [7] 
suggest verifications for the checking of the reachability of different topics, the rules 
for regulating the working of the system, and checking the configuration and 
reconfiguration after a failure. The novelty of the work in [7] is the creation and the 
optimization of a symbolic model checker that abstracts the end-to-end network 
configuration behaviour and using it to verify reachability and security properties. 
However, those researches did not consider the state explosion problem that the 
model could suffer. The research in this thesis improves the way of building an 
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overlay network model to decrease the total number of states. And this could better 
suit a MOM overlay network modelling.  
Besides the state explosion problem, finding a suitable way to build an abstract model 
for publish/subscribe based MOM overlay system is also complex. Researchers in 
Carnegie Mellon [90] proposed to build several reusable components for different 
requirements of a MOM system and implement a transformational framework that, 
starting from a dedicated programming language, produces XML data for model 
checking as well as executable artefacts for testing. However, their model in [90] is 
too general to represent the detail of MOM systems in different scenarios. The 
research presented in this thesis focuses on building a more specific model for 
verifying the configuration and reconfiguration for a MOM system with reusable 
components. Also this research extends the model with time restriction in the future, 
which researchers in Carnegie Mellon failed to cover in their work.  
For a communication system, the efficiency and correctness is heavily dependent on 
its design rules and protocols. System designers can fix or overcome vulnerabilities 
before the system suffers any losses by using model checking techniques to find 
vulnerabilities in rules and protocols. Researchers in [40] adapted SPIN, a model 
checking tools [149, 150], into a new one named ‘Bogor’ and added Bogor into a Java 
development environment. However, similar to SPIN, Bogor does not support CTL 
and time restrictions. So the research in this thesis uses NuSMV other than Bogor to 
support CTL and the time restrictions that are needed in verification of MOMs.  
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5 Formal Verification Model Checker for 
MOM Overlay Networks  
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.1, we first describe the use the 
language NuSMV, introduced in Chapter 3, as a means of manually creating a formal 
model of a 3-node MOM overlay network, which we can then use to test the validity 
of the configuration. A further example of a 6-node MOM overlay network is 
provided in Section 5.2. To our knowledge, the use of this language for formal 
checking MOM overlay network configurations has never be considered bef ore in 
published literature. Having demonstrated that the language provides a useful means 
of developing a formal model that can be used for verification purposes we then 
propose in Section 5.3, a new tool for the automatic generation of models of 
realistically sized MOM systems. We validate this tool on the 6-node network already 
considered, to confirm its satisfactory functioning. We also show how the novel 
sub-path detection mechanism can be used to speed up the verification process by 
reducing the magnitude of the path searching in Section 错误！未找到引用源。. Next, 
in Section 0, we use the tool to provide a formal model of a large network, something 
that would not be possible to do reliably by-hand. We also examine its performance. 
Finally in Section 5.5, we summarise the chapter. 
In our context, model checking is an automatic technique for verifying finite-state 
reactive systems. It is an attractive [90] alternative to formal reasoning a MOM 
system. The user provides a high level representation of the model and a specification 
written using temporal logic to be checked. The model checker finds bugs in a system 
by exploring all possible execution states of a finite state model to search for 
violations of some desired property. The model checker will either terminate with the 
answer ‘true’ (introduced in Chapter 3) or provide a counter example. While model 
checking is a powerful technique, one of the problems to using it is the creation of 
Formal Verification Model Checker for MOM Overlay Networks 
 
59 
 
appropriate finite state models for the systems being checked. This research must first 
find suitable abstractions that reduce a system to a finite state model, without 
eliminating the class of errors that this research wants to identify, should they exist.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3 the authors of [90] believe that there are two main barriers 
to creating a state model for a publish / subscribe (P/S) system that is suitable for 
model checking. One is the construction of finite-state approximations for each of the 
component behaviours (methods). The second problem is the construction of the 
run-time apparatus that ‘glues’ the components together, mediating their interaction 
via event announcements. In this research, these problems have been addressed to a 
certain degree. This chapter designs and implements suitable abstract models of 
MOM overlay networks. Since this formal verification language and temporal logic 
are not easy to comprehend, particularly as the scale of a MOM system increasing, it 
becomes too difficult for humans to manually create the models themselves. This 
chapter designs a P/S platform code generator with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
front end, from which a formal verification model can be automatically generated as 
shown in Figure 5-1. The only information users need to provide is the routing table(s) 
and topic table. The routing table(s) can be obtained through automated means, such 
as Dijkstra’s algorithm [221]. Later, Chapter 6 will solve the second problem, 
mentioned in [90]; that of run time challenges. By forecasting possible failures (such 
as link failures and node failures) and pre-calculating routing tables for those failure 
scenarios, this research can solve many run time issues that could arise. 
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Figure 5-1 Formal Verification Model Checker Functional Layout  
In order to simplify and consolidate the concepts described in Chapter 3 regarding 
MOM systems, model checkers, temporal logic and NuSMV, examples verifying of 
the correctness and validity of a MOM system’s configuration are provided, as well as 
when the MOM reconfigures after suffering a failure. The first model is composed of 
three brokers and it illustrates the situation of verifying the configuration of 
publishers and subscribers if they can link to a broker before and after a change 
(broker failure and recovery) has happened. The second model uses six brokers, and it 
focuses more on topic reachability verification. After describing our automated P/S 
platform code generator for creating NuSMV models, we illustrate its usefulness by 
examining a third model derived from a realistic commercial mission critical MOM 
system. The code generator generates models mainly for the purpose of topic 
reachability verification and loop detection of overlay networks. 
5.1 Three-Broker Model 
5.1.1 Modelling a Three-Broker Example 
In this model, there are three brokers and each of them takes responsibility of one 
publisher and one subscriber. To keep the model simple, the model does not 
incorporate routing. Therefore, the publisher publishes a topic to a subscriber, and 
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both are connected to the same broker. Consequentially, the subscriber only 
subscribes to a topic of a publisher connected to the same broker. A diagram of this 
model is provided in Figure 5-2. 
 
Figure 5-2 Three-Broker Connection Diagram 
The Three Brokers Model contains four states (normal, broker 1 fails, broker 2 fails, 
broker 3 fails, since we only consider single broker failure here). They are named 0s , 
in which all three brokers are functioning correctly, 1s , in which broker1 fails, 2s  
in which broker2 fails and 3s , in which broker3 fails. This simple model does not 
portray the situation when two or more brokers fail. Depending on different 
conditions, all of these states could be interchangeable.  
The Three Brokers Model in NuSMV contains three types of modules: the broker, the 
publisher and the subscriber. In the broker module there is a Boolean variable used to 
control the working state of the broker. In the publisher module, there is one integer 
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variable that indicates the topic this publisher publishes and three Boolean variables 
indicating the broker this publisher is linked to. In the subscriber module, an integer 
variable identifies the topic this subscriber is subscribed to. The following is t he 
NuSMV code for the broker module: 
MODULE broker 
  VAR 
   state :Boolean; 
MODULE publisher  
  VAR 
   pub_topic : 1..3; 
   pub_bro1 :Boolean; 
   pub_bro2 :Boolean; 
   pub_bro3 :Boolean; 
MODULE subscriber 
  VAR 
   sub_topic : 1..3; 
   sub_bro1 :Boolean; 
   sub_bro2 :Boolean; 
   sub_bro3 :Boolean; 
The reconfiguration process in this model is described as follows. If broker1 fails, all 
the publishers and subscribers linked to it will be taken over by broker2. Similarly, 
broker3 takes over the responsibility of broker2’s publishers and subscribers if 
broker2 fails. Finally, broker1 will take over the responsibility of broker3 if the 
broker3 fails. Every time there is a state transition, it will be verified by the LTL or 
CTL statements in NuSMV. In the initial state 0s , Pub_1 (publisher1) and Sub_1 
(subscriber1) are linked to Bro_1 (broker1), while Pub_2 (publisher2) and Sub_2 
(subscriber2) are linked to Bro_2 (broker2), and Pub_3 (publisher3) and Sub_3 
(subscriber3) are linked to Bro_3 (broker3).  
The state transition diagram is shown in Figure 5-3. 
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Figure 5-3 Three-Broker Model State Transition Diagram 
Figure 5-3 shows the conditions that trigger state interchanges. For clarity, in each 
state only the changed variables are shown. The state changes from 0s  to 1s  only 
when broker1 fails (Bro_1=FALSE) and publisher1 and subscriber1 linked to broker1 
are now linked to broker2. Thus, Pub_1.bro1=FALSE, Sub_1.bro1=FALSE, 
Pub_1.bro2=TRUE and Sub_1.bro2=TRUE. The situation will be the same when the 
state changes from 0s  to 2s  or 3s . In addition, Figure 5-3 shows the condition and 
the variables’ new values when the state changes from 1s , 2s  and 3s to the initia l 
state 0s . Things are a little different when the states are not reached from the unique 
state 0s . When the state changes from 1s  to 3s , the conditions are broker3 fails 
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(Bro_3=FALSE) while broker1 recovers (Bro_1=TRUE). Publisher1 and subscriber1  
are taken over by broker3 while broker1 is not alive. However, when broker1 recovers 
and is working again the situation changes to (Pub_1.bro3=FALSE, 
Pub_1.bro2=TRUE, Sub_1.bro3=FALSE and Sub_1.bro2=TRUE). If broker3 fails, 
publisher3 and subscriber3 will be attached to broker1 (Pub_3.bro3=FALSE, 
Pub_3.bro1=TRUE, Sub_3.bro3=FALSE and Sub_3.bro1=TRUE). The inverse 
situation can be easily derived. Other non-initial state interchanges are quite similar to 
the transition from 
1
s  to 
3
s . 
5.1.2 Model Verification 
In the three-broker model, this section verifies three points. Firstly, it verifies that if 
one broker fails, all the publishers and subscribers linked to it can successfully find a 
new broker to link to. This condition can be verified by the use of CTL statements. 
Assuming broker1 fails, for example: 
G !broker1.state -> X ( !publisher1.pub_bro1 & !subscriber1.sub_bro1 & 
publisher1.pub_bro2 & subscriber1.sub_bro2). (5-1) 
This logical statement means that when broker1 fails, publisher1 and subscriber1 will 
be re-linked to broker2. Figure 5-4 shows the results of this verification. The 
information following ‘***’ is just about the version of NuSMV and the copyright 
declaration which has nothing to do with the entire model and its verification. The 
salient information is the result of the specification.  
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Figure 5-4 Verification Output for Publisher and Subscriber Reconfiguration to Another Broker 
Subsequently, we represent screen shots such as Figure 5-4 as the following block    
and ignore NuSMV version information. 
Input: 
E:\NuSMV\bin>NuSMV three_broker_new.smv 
Output 
--specification ( G ! broker1.state -> X <<< ! publisher1.pub_bro1 & ! subscriber1.sub_bro1) 
& publisher1.pub_bro1) & subscriber1.sub_bro2)) is true 
Secondly, the following conditions must be true: every publisher has at least one 
subscriber to its topic and the vice versa. For an example,‘ s ubscriber2 has at least one 
publisher for the topic that subscriber2 wants to subscribe to’. This could be 
represented in an LTL statement as: 
LTLSPEC 
(subscriber1.sub_topic=publisher1.pub_topic|subscriber1.sub_topic=publisher2.pub
_topic | subscriber1.sub_topic=publisher3.pub_topic) (5-2) the following block 
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shows the results of this verification are true in this model.  
Input: 
E:\NuSMV\bin>NuSMV three_broker_new.smv 
Output 
--specification 
(subscriber1.sub_topic=publisher1.pub_topic|subscriber1.sub_topic=publisher2.pub_topic 
|subscriber1.sub_topic=publisher3.pub_topic)  is true 
Thirdly, the following condition must be hold when a broker returns to operational 
status: all the publishers and subscribers, which were linked to this broker before it 
failed, are now re-linked to this broker again. For example, assume broker 1 firstly 
fails and then returns to normal functioning. The assumption needs to be verified 
whether the publisher1 and subscriber 1 are re-linked to broker 1in the new state. So 
the operator ‘Y’ , which refers to the previous states, can be used. This could be 
indicated in the LTL statement: 
LTLSPEC  
G (Y !broker1.state & broker1.state) -> X (publisher1.pub_bro1 & 
subscriber1.sub_bro1 & !publisher1.pub_bro2 & !subscriber1.sub_bro2)   (5-3) 
错误！未找到引用源。 shows the results of this verification.  
Input: 
E:\NuSMV\bin>NuSMV three_broker_new.smv 
Output 
--specification G (Y !broker1.state & broker1.state) -> X (publisher1.pub_bro1 & 
subscriber1.sub_bro1 & !publisher1.pub_bro2 & !subscriber1.sub_bro2)     is true 
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5.2 Six-Broker Model 
This section uses a simplified model to perform the model checking of a publisher / 
subscriber based system. As an illustrative example we consider six brokers and each 
of them has a unique 4-byte IP address. Each broker has a number of publishers and 
subscribers linked to it.  
As shown in Figure 5-5, the address of Broker1 is ‘2.0.0.1’. Broker1 has a publisher 
who publishes topic A and a subscriber to topic C. The address of Broker2 is ‘2.0.1.1’ 
and it only has a subscriber which is interested in topic A. The address of Broker3 is 
‘2.0.0.2’ and it has a publisher of topic B and a subscriber to topic D. The address of 
Broker4 is ‘1.0.1.2’. Broker4 only has a subscriber that subscribes to topic B. The 
address of Broker5 is ‘1.0.0.1’ and it has a publisher of topic C and a subscriber of 
topic A. The address of Broker6 is ‘1.0.0.2’ and it has a publisher to topic D and a 
subscriber to topic C. To simplify this six brokers model, only one broker failure is 
considered at a time. So there would be seven different scenarios for this model. 
However, they are similar to each other. Therefore, this section only shows two of 
them. In the first scenario, all brokers are working correctly and in the second 
scenario one of the brokers fails.  
5.2.1 Scenraio1 – Normal Operation 
In Figure 5-5, all the brokers, publishers and subscribers’ information is shown. In 
Scenario 1, all the brokers are functioning well and their connections or routing paths 
are showed in Table 5-1. 
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Figure 5-5 Normal Network Layout for the Six-Broker Model Example  
The ‘*’ (star sign) means that any number from 0 to 2 could appear in that part of the 
address: 
Loc Src. Dest Loc’ Src’ Dest’ 
2.0.0.* * * 2.0.1.1 Src Dest 
2.0.1.1 2.0.*.* 1.0.*.* 1.0.1.2 Src Dest 
1.0.1.2 2.0.*.* 1.0.*.* 1.0.*.* Src Dest 
2.0.1.1 2.0.*.* 2.0.*.* 2.0.*.* Src Dest 
1.0.0.* * * 1.0.1.2 Src Dest 
1.0.1.2 1.0.*.* 2.0.*.* 2.0.1.1 Src Dest 
2.0.1.1 1.0.*.* 2.0.*.* 2.0.*.* Src Dest 
1.0.1.2 1.0.0.* 1.0.*.* 1.0.*.* Src Dest 
Table 5-1 Routing Table for Scenario 1 
In Table 5-1, the first column shows the current location of a message. The second 
column shows the address of the broker where the message is originated (broker’s 
source address). The third column shows the address of the broker for which domain 
the message is destined (broker’s destination address). The fourth column gives the 
next hop of a message. The fifth and sixth columns mean that after this hop the source 
and destination brokers will not change. 
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Topic Publisher(broker IP Address) Subscriber(broker IP Address)  
A B1(2.0.0.1) B2 (2.0.1.1) 
B5 (1.0.0.1) 
B B3 (2.0.0.2) B4 (1.0.1.2) 
C B5 (1.0.0.1) B1 (2.0.0.1) 
B6 (1.0.0.2) 
D B6 (1.0.0.1) B3 (2.0.0.2) 
Table 5-2 Topics in Scenario 1 
After the topology of the publish/subscribe system is constructed in the routing table, 
it is necessary to describe all the existing topics of the publish/subscribe system and 
inform the source (publisher) and destination (subscriber) of every topic. In this way, 
the reachability of the path that every message topic traverses in the system can be 
verified.  
For example, based on Table 5-2, it is seen that Broker3 (2.0.0.2) publishes topic B 
and Broker4 (1.0.0.1) subscribes to this topic. Table 5-1 clearly shows that a message 
located at 2.0.0.2 (Broker3) whose destination address is 1.0.0.1 (Broker4) will 
traverse the path from 2.0.0.2 (Broker3) to 2.0.1.1 (Broker2) and finally to 1.0.1.2 
(Broker4).  
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5.2.2 Scenario2 – Broker 1 Failure 
 
Figure 5-6 The Layout of the Six Brokers’ Model When Broker1 Fails  
In Scenario 2, Broker1 fails. The publisher attached to Broker1 is relocated to 
Broker2 and the subscriber is relocated to Broker3. As a result, the new routing and 
topic tables change to those shown in Table 5-3 and Table 5-4, respectively.  
Loc Src Dest Loc’ Src’ Dest’ 
2.0.0.2 * * 2.0.1.1 Src Dest 
2.0.1.1 2.0.*.* 1.0.*.* 1.0.1.2 Src Dest 
1.0.1.2 2.0.*.* 1.0.*.* 1.0.*.* Src Dest 
2.0.1.1 2.0.1.1 2.0.0.2 2.0.0.2 Src Dest 
1.0.0.* * * 1.0.1.2 Src Dest 
1.0.1.2 1.0.*.* 2.0.*.* 2.0.1.1 Src Dest 
2.0.1.1 1.0.*.* 2.0.*.* 2.0.*.* Src Dest 
1.0.1.2 1.0.0.* 1.0.*.* 1.0.*.* Src Dest 
Table 5-3 Routing Table for Scenario2 - Broker1 Fails  
Table 5-4 presents the topics table for scenario2. It shows every topic with its 
publisher(s) and subscriber(s). This is used in future as input information for building 
the six-broker model.  
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Topic Publisher(broker IP Address) Subscriber(broker IP 
Address) 
A B2(2.0.1.1) B2 (2.0.1.1) 
B5 (1.0.0.1) 
B B3 (2.0.0.2) B4 (1.0.1.2) 
C B5 (1.0.0.1) B3 (2.0.0.2) 
B6 (1.0.0.2) 
D B6 (1.0.0.1) B3 (2.0.0.2) 
Table 5-4 Topics Table for Scenario2 - Broker1 Fails 
There are seven scenarios for single broker failure in this model. Scenario 1 in which 
all the brokers are working; Scenario 2 in which only broker one fails, Scenario 3 in 
which only broker two fails, Scenario 4 in which only broker three fails, Scenario 5 in 
which only broker four fails, Scenario 6 in which only broker five fails, Scenario 7 in 
which only broker six fails.  
In NuSMV, there is one module for the broker, which contains a Boolean variable to 
indicate the working state of the broker. In the MAIN module (just like the main 
method in a Java programming language), there are four integer variables to indicate 
the source IP address and the same for the destination IP address. In addition, there is 
an integer variable used to represent the current location that a packet is in and one 
integer variable used to indicate the destination broker number. After building the 
entire routing table in NuSMV, the six brokers model can verify the reachability from 
a certain broker to the others in the seven different scenarios. 
5.2.3 Model Generation with NuSMV  
After having all the necessary information, which is the routing table and topic table, 
a framework of a NuSMV file meeting the rules of the NuSMV Language can be 
built.  
Firstly, all the variables used in the NuSMV program needs to be defined with their 
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types like ‘Boolean’ or ‘integer’. In this example, there are source address variable, 
destination address variable, current location address variable, broker address variable 
and so on.  
MODULE main 
VAR 
s0 : 0..2; 
s1 : 0..2; 
s2 : 0..2; 
s3 : 0..2; 
 
d0 : 0..2; 
d1 : 0..2; 
d2 : 0..2; 
d3 : 0..2; 
 
loc : 0..6; 
 
loc_des : 0..6; 
Secondly, it is necessary to give all the variables’ initial values and also the values in 
the next state. The source and the destination value will not change in all the states 
until this verification is done and new source and destination addresses will be put in 
by the user. The initial value of the current location address variable will be the 
source address and it changes according to the routing table. Following the part of the 
current location’ initial value and values in the next state: 
The initial value is given as: 
init(loc) := 
case 
s0=1 & s1=0 & s2=0 & s3=2 : 1; 
s0=1 & s1=1 & s2=0 & s3=2 : 2; 
s0=2 & s1=0 & s2=0 & s3=2 : 3; 
s0=2 & s1=1 & s2=0 & s3=1 : 4; 
s0=1 & s1=0 & s2=0 & s3=1 : 5; 
s0=2 & s1=0 & s2=0 & s3=1 : 6; 
TRUE                      : 0; 
esac; 
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The next state value is as follows: 
next(loc) := 
case 
 loc= 1 &loc_des= 2 : 2; 
 loc= 1 &loc_des= 3 : 2; 
 loc= 1 &loc_des= 4 : 2; 
 loc= 1 &loc_des= 5 : 2; 
 loc= 1 &loc_des= 6 : 2; 
 loc= 2 &loc_des= 1 : 1; 
 loc= 2 &loc_des= 3 : 3; 
 loc= 2 &loc_des= 4 : 4; 
 loc= 2 &loc_des= 5 : 4; 
 loc= 2 &loc_des= 6 : 4; 
 loc= 3 &loc_des= 1 : 2; 
 loc= 3 &loc_des= 2 : 2; 
 loc= 3 &loc_des= 4 : 2; 
 loc= 3 &loc_des= 5 : 2; 
 loc= 3 &loc_des= 6 : 2; 
 loc= 4 &loc_des= 1 : 2; 
 loc= 4 &loc_des= 2 : 2; 
 loc= 4 &loc_des= 3 : 2; 
 loc= 4 &loc_des= 5 : 5; 
 loc= 4 &loc_des= 6 : 6; 
 loc= 5 &loc_des= 1 : 4; 
 loc= 5 &loc_des= 2 : 4; 
 loc= 5 &loc_des= 3 : 4; 
 loc= 5 &loc_des= 4 : 4; 
 loc= 5 &loc_des= 6 : 4; 
 loc= 6 &loc_des= 1 : 4; 
 loc= 6 &loc_des= 2 : 4; 
 loc= 6 &loc_des= 3 : 4; 
 loc= 6 &loc_des= 4 : 4; 
 loc= 6 &loc_des= 5 : 4; 
TRUE                : 0; 
esac; 
After the model been constructed, verification can take place. A user can change 
different CTL or LTL verification statements through the text file storing the 
specification statements. Then the statements are written into the end part of the 
NuSMV file. The following is an example of a specification for 6-broekr model: 
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SPEC 
EF(loc=loc_des)                                        (5-4) 
Besides manually input the testing source and the destination, later on we build an 
Code generator (introduced in section 5.3) which could automatically generate test 
pairs of topics’ source and destination by matching the topic table. For example, 
publisher1 publishes topic A to broker1 while subscriber3 linked to broker3 and 
subscriber5 linked to broker5 all subscribe to topic. Therefore, broker1 will be the 
source and broker3 and broker5 will be the destinations. Thus two CTL statements are 
automatically generated: 
EF (source=1 & loc=3);                                   (5-5) 
EF (source=1 & loc=5);                                  (5-6) 
The first statement means that ‘if there finally is a state that its source is broker1 and 
the current location is broker3’. That is performed a searched that there is a path from 
broker1 to broker3. Things are the same with the second statement. In either case, an 
executable NuSMV file generated.  
5.2.4 Reachability Verification for the Six-Broker Model 
As a publish/subscribe system grows in scale, there will be more brokers, publishers 
and subscribers. Every time one publish/subscribe system adds a new device or a 
failure happened, the model will change. So the reconfiguration of this system should 
be verified.  
Based on the model built in NuSMV for the Six Brokers Model, the reachability of 
each topic from its source broker to its destination broker could be easily verified. In 
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this model, it is necessary to make sure that a packet from a certain publisher will 
reach all the required subscribers. The reachability condition can be represented in a 
CTL statement as: 
EF loc (this is the location of current IP address) = loc_des (this is the destination IP 
address).   (5-7) 
Where loc is the location of the current IP address; loc_des is the destination IP 
address. Formula 5-7 indicates that finally there will be a state where the current 
location of a message coincides with its destination address. This means that 
eventually the message will arrive at its destination.  
The Topic table lists all the possible sources and destinations of each topic. Therefore, 
our publish/subscribe (P/S) tester goes through this table and tests all the sources and 
destinations topic by topic. If there are a large numbers of topics, the tester will take a 
long time to test all the sources and destinations entries. However, the path of a topic 
could be a sub-path of another already successfully tested path, consequently this 
sub-path do not need to be tested again. An algorithm that extracts all the maximum 
paths could be applied to the routing and topic tables and only those paths need to be 
verified, decreasing the testing time.  
Input: 
NuSMV > go 
NuSMV > pick_state –r 
NuSMV > print_current_state –v 
Output: 
Current state is 1.1 
s0 = 1 
s1 = 0 
s2 = 0 
s3 = 2 
d0 =2 
d1 =0 
d2 =0 
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d3 =1 
loc= 1 
loc_des = 6 
broker1.state = TRUE 
broker2.state = TRUE 
broker3.state = TRUE 
broker4.state = TRUE 
broker5.state = TRUE 
broker6.state = TRUE 
y=6 
The above block shows the initial state of this six brokers’ model. In this state, the 
source is 2.0.0.1 and the destination is 1.0.0.2; the current location is exactly the 
source broker- the broker1 and its destination broker is the broker6; all the brokers are 
functioning correctly. As it is shown in the above block, there is a variable named ‘y’ 
which can varies from 0 to 6. By using this variable, this system can model the 
brokers’ failure. In other words, a broker will fail as long as this broker’s id number 
equals the value of y. For example, if y=0, that means all the brokers are functionally 
well. In the above block, y=6, which means that in next state broker6 will be failed. 
The routing table is based on the scenario where broker 6 is out of order.  
Input: 
NuSMV six_broker.smv 
Output: 
--specification EF loc = loc_des is true 
The above block shows the output of the verification statement ‘EF (loc=loc_des)’ in 
this six brokers’ model. Moreover, the value is ‘true’, which means that message 
could be successfully sent from broker1 to broker6.  
5.2.5 Validating the Reachability Verification in NuSMV 
In order to validate the correctness of the reachability verification, this section designs 
an experiment to compare the simulation results with the result observed directly. 
Based on the routing table 5-3 and topic table 5-4, there is topic A published by 
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publisher attached to broker 1 and two brokers (broker 2 and broker 5) subscribed this 
topic. If letting broker 4 cannot seen broker 5 and every package at broker 4 will be 
sent to broker 6, this topic A’s reachability (from broker 1 to broker 5) will not be 
possible. Following is the output of topic A’s reachability from broker 1 to broker 5.  
Input: 
NuSMV six_broker.smv 
Output: 
--specification EF loc = loc_des is false 
--as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample 
Trace Type: Counterexample 
->State: 1.1 <- 
s0 = 1 
s1 = 0 
s2 = 0 
s3 = 2 
d0 =1 
d1 =0 
d2 =0 
d3 =1 
loc= 1 
loc_des = 5 
broker1.state = TRUE 
broker2.state = TRUE 
broker3.state = TRUE 
broker4.state = TRUE 
broker5.state = TRUE 
broker6.state = TRUE 
y=0 
 
The above block indicates that the topic source is broker 1 and destination is broker 5, 
but this topic cannot be sent to its destination. As long as a failure is known, further 
tracing can be done to see where the problem is.  
input: 
NuSMV > simulate –r 4 
Output: 
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******  Simulation Starting From State 1.1  ****** 
 
Input: 
NuSMV > show_traces –t 
Output: 
There is 1 trace currently available. 
 
Input: 
NuSMV > show_traves –v 
Output: 
<!-- ############### Trace number: 1 ############### --> 
Trace Description: Simulation Trace 
Trace Type: Simulation 
->State: 1.1 <- 
s0 = 1 
s1 = 0 
s2 = 0 
s3 = 2 
d0 =1 
d1 =0 
d2 =0 
d3 =1 
loc= 1 
loc_des = 5 
broker1.state = TRUE 
broker2.state = TRUE 
broker3.state = TRUE 
broker4.state = TRUE 
broker5.state = TRUE 
broker6.state = TRUE 
y=0 
->State: 1.2 <- 
s0 = 1 
s1 = 0 
s2 = 0 
s3 = 2 
d0 =1 
d1 =0 
d2 =0 
d3 =1 
loc= 2 
loc_des = 5 
broker1.state = TRUE 
broker2.state = TRUE 
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broker3.state = TRUE 
broker4.state = TRUE 
broker5.state = TRUE 
broker6.state = TRUE 
y=0 
->State: 1.3 <- 
s0 = 1 
s1 = 0 
s2 = 0 
s3 = 2 
d0 =1 
d1 =0 
d2 =0 
d3 =1 
loc= 4 
loc_des = 5 
broker1.state = TRUE 
broker2.state = TRUE 
broker3.state = TRUE 
broker4.state = TRUE 
broker5.state = TRUE 
broker6.state = TRUE 
y=0 
->State: 1.4 <- 
s0 = 1 
s1 = 0 
s2 = 0 
s3 = 2 
d0 =1 
d1 =0 
d2 =0 
d3 =1 
loc= 6 
loc_des = 5 
broker1.state = TRUE 
broker2.state = TRUE 
broker3.state = TRUE 
broker4.state = TRUE 
broker5.state = TRUE 
broker6.state = TRUE 
y=0 
->State: 1.5 <- 
s0 = 1 
s1 = 0 
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s2 = 0 
s3 = 2 
d0 =1 
d1 =0 
d2 =0 
d3 =1 
loc= 6 
loc_des = 5 
broker1.state = TRUE 
broker2.state = TRUE 
broker3.state = TRUE 
broker4.state = TRUE 
broker5.state = TRUE 
broker6.state = TRUE 
y=0 
The above block indicates the path of this topic trying to go through from broker 1 to 
broker 5. However, after this topic package arrives at Broker 6 it remains there and 
cannot reach Broker 5. This output is the same as the observed result. Modelling a 
Realistic MOM System 
In previous sections of this chapter, we examine two illustrative models for a 
publish/subscribe based MOM. However, those two models are far too simple to 
represent a realistic MOM. They are used to illustrate the main approaches of 
modelling, verifying MOM systems by the means of using a model checker. In this 
chapter, a realistic MOM, an extended Harmony System [44] used in the USA, is 
modelled.  
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Figure 5-7 Realistic Commercial MOM Overlay Network 
As shown in Figure 5-7, there are fifty brokers in total. Each broker has a set of topics 
(either publishing or subscribing). With the number of brokers growing, manually 
generating the correspondent routing table is extremely complex and error pr one. 
However, the link information of each implemented broker is easier for user to collect. 
This research designed a graphical user interface (GUI) to collect the link table of the 
brokers and the topic table. The information collected is automatically translated into 
a hashmap. In the implemented tool, the link information of the brokers along with 
the selection of a specific routing algorithm (e.g. shortest path) are used to 
automatically generate the routing table of the MOM overlay network. The 
implemented NuSMV code generator reads the hashmap and generates a full NuSMV 
MOM model with all the specifications for the verification.  
The following sections describe the whole processes of building and verifying a 
MOM system model in NuSMV. 
5.2.6 The MOM Model in NuSMV 
As mentioned in the beginning, the key task for constructing a NuSMV model is to 
find a suitable finite state model to replace the original system. We model the entire 
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MOM overlay network as a finite state machine, while each state is defined by a 
different broker ID. The state transition of the overlay network is determined by the 
topics and the routing protocol in the overlay network. The routing protocol in this 
model is the shortest path first. A topic starts from its source broker and follows its 
shorted path route until it reaches its destination broker.  
Each of the three state variables for framing the NuSMV model ( src , dest and loc ) 
has the set of broker IDs (e.g. 1,2,…,49,50) as domain. So there are 51.25 10  
possible states combinations for our model. All the variables are given initial values 
and rules for their next states transition. The initial values of loc is the initial value 
of src  as a topic’s initial current location is its source broker.  
In the CTL specification the initial values for src  and dest keep the same 
throughout. The rules for the next state transition of loc  follow the matrix R 
(depending on the current value of loc  and the value of dest ) and are similar to 
Formula 5-11. 
For example, following Figure 5-10, if Broker 1 has a topic about the ‘weather’ and 
Broker 13 subscribes to this topic, then the state transition diagram is shown in Figure 
5-8. 
 
Figure 5-8 State Transition Diagram Segment (One Source and One Topic) 
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The first transition for this topic is from state 1, 13, 1src dest loc   , and results in the 
next states 1, 13, 16src dest loc   , and so on.  
Loop Detection 
Our implemented NuSMV model checker also provides a way of detecting the 
existence of loops in the routing table. The aim of loop detection is to find out 
whether a message goes back to a broker that it has already passed through. Equation 
5-12 shows an example rule for detecting a loop path at Broker 1: 
1 ( ( ! 1))src EX AF src  
          (5-12) 
Formula 5-12 will be true if a message does not pass through Broker 1 again after 
passing through it once. However, it is possible that a broker is the source broker as 
well as the destination broker at the same time (it has a subscriber of a specific topic, 
but at the same time, this broker also has a publisher to the same topic). Equation 5-12 
will be evaluated to be false, as the source and destination broker are the same for that 
topic. There are two ways to overcome this problem. The first is to extract all the 
topics whose sources and destinations are in the same broker. The second way would 
be to use Timed CTL to impose a restriction in Formula 5-12 where it would only 
evaluate to false if and only if the message again passes through the same broker after 
it has traversed one or more hops. 
Table 5-5 displays a performance comparison between using and not using the 
sub-path detection algorithm for the fifty-broker model.  
Number 
of topics 
 
 
Average number of paths to be 
tested 
Average time to generate NuSMV 
code (ms) over 50 experiments on 
each different number of topics  
Sub-path 
detection 
No sub-path 
detection 
Sub-path 
detection 
No sub-path 
detection 
10 30 50 2 7 
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50 120 250 3 27 
100 200 500 7 67 
500 468 2500 15 183 
1000 550 5000 18 318 
5000 570 25000 21 7942 
10000 588 50000 37 58627 
Table 5-5 Sub-Path Detection Performance Comparison 
In order to assess the performance of our sub-path detection algorithm, we 
automatically generate different numbers of topics and assign each topic to 5 
subscribers. From Table 5-8, we can see that by using the sub-path detection the 
number of paths to be verified by NuSMV and the total time of generation are 
significantly reduced.  
5.2.7 Verifying Failures in a Large Scale MOM System 
The two main types of failure within a MOM system are path failure or degradation 
beyond acceptable limits and broker failure. There are many reasons (e.g. path or 
buffer overload, power outages) that can lead to a failure. Quite a few researchers 
have devoted time to load balancing [63, 64, 65, 66, 67] and provide measures to 
prevent failures. However, failures may still happen and a robust system needs to 
respond quickly to such incidents. In this research, since the user needs to manually 
input brokers’ information, incorrect configuration may happen. It is possible that the 
user may forget a link or accidentally isolate a broker. This thesis proposes a way to 
verify failures on paths and on brokers.  
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Figure 5-9 Failure of Direct Path between Broker 13 and 17 
In previous sections, an integrated model for verifying the reachability for all topics 
has been presented. The model checker will terminate with either ‘true’ or ‘false’ to 
show the availability of a path or otherwise. All unavailable paths will be noted down 
and then their one-hop sub-paths will be tested again to locate the failed link(s). In 
Figure 5-9, let’s assume that the direct path from Broker 13 to 17 has failed (we name 
this failed path as P1). Since P1 failed, all paths that involve P1 will terminate with 
‘false’. For example, the path from Broker 12 to 18, which including P1, will 
terminate with ‘false’. Then, its one-hop sub-paths which are the direct path from 
Broker 12 to 14, the direct path from Broker 14 to 13, the direct path from Broker 13 
to Broker 17 and the direct path from Broker 17 to 18 will be retested. In this scenario, 
only the direct path from Broker 13 to 17 will terminate with ‘false’ and then we can 
locate the failure path.  
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Figure 5-10 Failure of Broker 17 
If a broker fails, all the direct paths traversing the failed broker will be unreachable. 
By the same measure, as shown in Figure 5-10, the direct path from Broker 13 to 17, 
the direct path from Broker 16 to 17 and the direct path from Broker 18 to 17 will test 
unreachable. There is then a high probability that Broker 17 has failed.  
After locating the failure paths and brokers, the user can revise the topology and 
compensate for the failures. 
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5.3 Automatic Code Generator 
As a publish/subscribe system grows in scale, there will be more brokers, publishers 
and subscribers. Every time one publish/subscribe system adds a new device, the 
reconfiguration of this system should be verified. Therefore, the model will change. It 
is time consuming to rebuild the model and write a new file to verify its 
reconfiguration. It is more efficient to have a code generator where users just need to 
provide the rules and a routing table. 
This research develops a code generator that automatically builds the 
(Publisher/Subscriber) tester. A GUI first collects overlay network configuration 
information and stores it in a hash map. The hash map is then used directly as 
information to be read from or written to by the Java-based Automatic Code 
Generator program. In this way, the SPF routing table will be generated and a Java 
Parser reads this routing information and builds a new model in NuSMV along with 
the appropriate NuSMV rules. A flowchart of the Code Generator is shown in Figure 
5-11.  
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User input 
brokers’connection 
and topics through 
GUI 
A Hash Map generated 
by GUI class ans 
passed to code 
generator class
While (hash map has next 
record)
Add correspounded 
information to broker 
link information array  
Calling SPF algorithm 
method to generate 
routing table and stored 
as data structure P
Based on the two diamtional 
array P and the rules of 
NuSMV language, Code 
Generator creates the model of 
this overlay network in  
NuSMV language.
Searching the Hash Map again, 
following the rules of sub-path 
detection and temporal logic, 
Code Generator creates the last 
part ot the NuSMV file-- 
verification specifications 
Running NuSMV file under 
the settled envirenment and 
checking the truth of each 
verification specifications 
Start
end
Yes
No
 
Figure 5-11 Code Generator Flowchart  
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5.3.1 Broker Information Collection 
The first step of building this verification system is to collect the broker information 
and then setup the overlay network in NuSMV model checker. Thus the user needs to 
provide the total number of brokers in the overlay network (this will only need to be 
input once at the beginning) and the information for each broker. The information for 
each broker includes the identification (ID) of the broker that is used to identify the 
broker in the overlay network; the IDs of the neighbouring brokers that have direct 
connections to this broker; and the published and subscribed topics that this broker 
dispatches.  
A GUI is used to collect broker link information and the topic table. Figure 5-12 is a 
screen shot for the GUI.  
 
Figure 5-12 A Screen Shot for the GUI Interface Implemented in This Research 
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This GUI interface fac ilities the collection of both the link table for brokers and the 
topic table in the following sequence: 
Step 1: The user indicates how many brokers there are in the system that need to be 
verified (this number is named ‘TOTAL’ in the remaining steps). Then press ‘Create’.  
Step 2: After pressing ‘Create’, for each broker, the user inputs the broker ID, total 
number of neighbouring brokers, link information and also the topics this broker is 
publishing and subscribing.  
Step 3: After the user has finished inputting a broker’s information, they should 
press the ‘update’ button to write the information into a hash map.  
Step 4: If the user wants to rewrite the information of a specific broker, he/she can 
input the broker’s ID number at the space for broker ID and then press the ‘clear’ 
button. All the stored information for that broker is deleted and the user can rewrite 
the information.  
Step 5: After the information of all brokers has been stored in the hash map, the 
button named ‘finish’ at the bottom of the window will be active to be pressed. 
Step 6: When the user presses the ‘finish’ button, all the link information for 
brokers and topic tables stored in the hash map is sent to a class named 
‘RoutingTableGenerate.java’ to generate the routing table, the topic table, the 
NuSMV model and verification specifications. For now, the routing table is based on 
the Shortest Path Algorithm.  
5.3.2 Hash Map Generation 
The first step of building this verification system is to collect the broker information 
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and then setup the overlay network in NuSMV model checker. Thus the user needs to 
provide the total number of brokers in the overlay network (this will only need to be 
input once at the beginning) and the information for each broker. The information for 
each broker includes the identification (ID) of the broker that is used to identify the 
broker in the overlay network; the IDs of the neighbouring brokers that have direct 
connections to this broker; and the published and subscribed topics that this broker 
dispatches. This information is used to further automatically generate a routing table 
that contains the shortest path between any two brokers in the network, and the 
subscribed and published topic distribution information. This information is stored 
into the hash map. The structure of the hash map is 
HashMap<brokerID,HashMap<<neighboringBrokers,value><publishTopics,value><s
ubscribeTopics,value>>> 
The key to the outer hash map is the ID of a broker. The inner hash map has three 
keys the ‘neighbouringBrokers’ , ‘publishTopics’ and ‘subscribeTopics’ of that broker. 
Table 5-6 illustrates the information that is stored in the hash map structure for the 
first 3 brokers of Figure 5-10: 
brokerID  Neighbouring 
Brokers  
publishedTopics  subscribedTopics  
1 11,16 weather, films  music  
2 11,18 sports  weather, stock 
3 11,16 music  sports  
Table 5-6 Structure of the Stored MOM Configuration 
The part in the hash map storing information for broker 1 will be: 
HashMap<1,HashMap<<neighboringBrokers,’ 
11,16’><publishTopics,’weather,films’><subscribeTopics,’music’>>> 
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5.3.3 Routing Table Generation 
Here we define a path as a set containing all brokers that a message passes through 
from its source to destination during delivery. All possible paths for the overlay 
network are generated by using Djikstra’s shortest path algorithm [26] based upon the 
link information, which refers to the broker and its direct connected brokers 
(neighbouring brokers). The shortest paths for each source and destination are stored 
in a two dimensional array ( n n ), where n is the number of brokers in the network. 
This information can be represented as a matrix P  where the rows correspond to the 
source broker IDs, the columns correspond to the destination broker IDs and the 
values are the corresponding sets containing the correspondent shortest paths:  
1,1 1,2 1,
2,1 2,2 2,
,1 ,2 ,
...
...
... ... ... ...
...
n
n
n n n n
p p p
p p p
P
p p p
 
 
 
 
 
                     (5-8) 
With the help of the GUI interface, link information of the brokers and the topic table 
are collected and stored in a hash map. This hash map is passed to the 
‘RoutingTableGenerate.java’ class and used to generate the routing table as well as 
the verification specifications of the reachability of topics. The 
‘RoutingTableGenerate.java’ class automatically performs the task of generating an 
abstract model for verifying MOM systems.  
Firstly, this class splits link information from the hash map into a two dimension 
(50 50)  integer array named ‘broker’. The first dimension of index of ‘broker’ 
indicates the ID for a broker, and the second dimension of index displays the number 
of the broker’s neighbouring brokers. For example, in this fifty broker model, broker 
1 has two neighbour brokers. One is broker 11 and the other is broker 16. The link 
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information of broker 1 will be stored as: ‘broker[1][0]=11’, ‘broker[1][1]=16’.  
After translating the entire link information into ‘broker[][]’, this class constructs a 
routing table using a two dimension (50 50) String array named ‘path’ in which the 
shortest paths for any two brokers are stored. In this array, the indexes indicate the ID 
of the source (first index) broker and the ID of the destination broker (second index); 
and the value records a list of broker IDs (destination broker ID included) that are the 
nodes of the shorted path from the source broker to the destination broker, e.g., 
path[A][B] = ‘C,D,B’ means that the shorted path from broker A to broker B is A – C 
– D – B. The following steps give a brief summary of the routing table generation 
process: 
 First, the value for ‘path[][]’ is initiated. In this array, the values for 
‘path[m][n]’(1 ≤ m ≤ 50, 1≤ n ≤50, m ≠ n) are set to ‘null’, the values for 
‘path[m][m]’(1 ≤ m ≤ 50) is set to ‘m’, and the values for ‘path[0][n]’ (1 ≤ n ≤ 50) 
and ‘path[m][0]’ (1 ≤ m ≤ 50) are set to 0. 
 Second, one hop paths (a broker and its neighbours) are retrieved and recorded in 
path[][], i.e., for each broker i, the path information for its neighbouring broker j 
(retrieved from broker[][]) is updated to path[i][j] = ‘j’.  
 Third, every broker starts to learn from its neighbouring brokers. For example, 
broker 1 has broker 11 and broker 16 as its neighbouring brokers. Broker 11 has 
broker 19, broker 26, broker 1, broker 2 and broker 3 as its neighbouring brokers. 
Broker 16 has broker 31, broker 17, broker 1, broker 2 and broker 3 as its 
neighbouring brokers. So, broker 1 will learn that path[1][19]=‘11,19’, 
path[1][26]=‘11,26’, path[1][2]=‘11,2’, path[1][3]=‘11,3’, path[1][31]=‘16,31’, 
path[1][17]=‘16,17’. As long as the path[i][j] ( , {0,1,2,...50}i j ) has values, a 
new path from broker i to broker j will not be updated. By this, this program can 
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make sure every path is the shortest path from broker i to broker j. This kind of 
learning process continues until there is no ‘null’ value in ‘path[][]’.  
After generating the matrix P (showing in Formula 5-8), the routing table for the 
overlay network is generated. The routing table can be represented as a matrix R 
where each row corresponds to a broker (Broker ID) of a topic and each column 
represents a destination broker (Broker ID). The value stored in the matrix shows the 
next hop according to its current location and destination.  
1,1 1,2 1,
2,1 2,2 2,
,1 ,2 ,
...
...
... ... ... ...
...
n
n
n n n n
r r r
r r r
R
r r r
 
 
 
 
 
              (5-9) 
For example, for a particular topic, the first 3 brokers of Figure 5-10, we have the 
routing information shown in 错误！未找到引用源。:  
Loc. Dest. Loc. 
1 
3,7,11,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,2728,29,30,31,32,33,34,35, 
36,37,38,39,40,41,42,42,44 
11 
1 2,4,5,6,8,9,10,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,20,31,45,46,47,48,49,50  16 
2 
7,8,9,11,12,19,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39, 
40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50 
11 
2 1,3,10,14,16,31, 16 
2 4,5,6,13,15,17,18,20, 18 
3 
3,7,11,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,2728,29,30,31,32,33,34,35, 
36,37,38,39,40,41,42,42,44 
11 
3 2,4,5,6,8,9,10,12,13,14,15,16, 17,18,20,31,45,46,47,48,49,50  16 
Table 5-7 of Routing Table Example 
In this table, the first column shows the broker ID. The second column shows the 
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identification of the destination broker. The last column provides the next hop of that 
message. 
5.4 Sub Path Detection for Reduced Verification Time 
The examples explored in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 could be extended to a much larger 
system (many brokers, publishers, subscribers and topics). By using the code 
generator to build the NUSMV Publisher/Subscriber tester, the user could input the 
corresponding routing table and rules for the larger system. Those routing tables and 
rules could be verified through CTL and LTL formulas.  
However the larger the system, the more complex the rules and logic become. If there 
are too many state variables, the model can suffer from a state explosion [7]. This 
research performed experimentation to compare the time the NuSMV takes to  
generate systems of different sizes. The systems are modelled using simple rules as 
the one used to the six-broker example. As can be seen in Table 5-10 错误！未找到引
用源。, a system with 384 brokers would take 2591069ms to be generated in NuSMV. 
If the system, with 384 brokers, fails, the whole model should be built again to verify 
the reconfiguration and this would take nearly one hour. This delay would be 
prohibitive for many real working systems as they need a quick response for the new 
system reconfiguration to be correct. Fortunately, according to the authors of [14], 
brokers can be high capacity, which is to say even large systems typically comprise 
less than 50 brokers. One of the solutions to avoid the state explosion problem is 
proposed in [11]. The authors propose to break the system into smaller sub-systems 
and verify each sub-system separately.  
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Number of 
brokers 
XML 
code 
lines 
NuSMV 
code 
lines 
Average time to 
generate NuSMV code 
(ms) (tested over 10000 
experiments) 
6 138 188 85 
12 558 320 379 
24 2262 800 729 
48 9126 2624 1069 
96 36678 9728 9336 
192 147078 37760 144605 
384 589062 149120 2591069 
Table 5-8 Comparison of Code Generation for Different Sized Systems 
In order to decrease the time for the model generation, this research has implemented 
an algorithm that extracts all the routing sub-paths contained in the topic table. In this 
way only the super paths need to be verified. For example, in Table 5-2, topic A will 
be sent from Broker 1 to Broker 5. If the path from Broker 1 to Broker 5 is proved to 
be reachable, then all its sub-paths (Broker 1 to Broker 2, Broker 1 to Broker 4, 
Broker 2 to Broker 4, Broker 2 to Broker 5 and Broker 4 to Broker 5) will be 
reachable too. Consequently, although a MOM system can have a very a large number 
of topics, the checker must only verify the reachability of the super paths of the 
MOM. 
In order to detect all the sub-paths in this six-broker model, this research builds a 
topicTable.txt file to store the topic table information. Additionally, the topic table 
information will be stored in a simpler form (just the publisher broker’s id and the 
subscriber’s broker id per line) in the topicTable.txt file. For example, table 5-2 will 
be stored as: 
 
 
Formal Verification Model Checker for MOM Overlay Networks 
 
97 
 
1 2 
1 5 
3 4 
5 1 
5 6 
6 3 
The first column stores the publisher brokers’ IDs and the second column stores the 
subscriber brokers’ IDs. Then, this research builds a Java class called SubPaths.java. 
In this Java file, all the possible sub paths are stored. Setting Broker 1 as an example: 
switch (pubBrokerID){ 
       
    case 0 : //the publisher broker is broker 1 
     switch (subBrokerID){  
case 0: //the subscriber broker is broker 1 and the super path is from 
broker 1 to broker 1 
paths[0].pathTester[0]=1; //the sub path is from broker 1 to broker 
1 
      break; 
case 1: //the subscriber broker is broker 2 and the super path is from 
broker 1 to broker 2 
       paths[0].pathTester[0]=1;  
       paths[1].pathTester[1]=1;  
paths[0].pathTester[1]=1;// the sub path is from broker 1 to broker 
2 
paths[1].pathTester[0]=1; // the sub path is from broker 2 to broker 
1 
      break; 
case 2://the subscriber broker is broker 3 and the super path is from 
broker 1 to broker 3 
       paths[0].pathTester[0]=1;  
       paths[1].pathTester[1]=1;  
       paths[2].pathTester[2]=1;  
       paths[0].pathTester[1]=1;  
paths[1].pathTester[0]=1; paths[0].pathTester[2]=1; // the sub path 
is from broker 1 to broker 3 
       paths[2].pathTester[0]=1;  
       paths[1].pathTester[2]=1;  
       paths[2].pathTester[1]=1;  
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      break; 
case 3: //the subscriber broker is broker 4 and the super path is from 
broker 1 to broker 4 
       paths[0].pathTester[0]=1;  
       paths[1].pathTester[1]=1;  
       paths[3].pathTester[3]=1;  
       paths[0].pathTester[1]=1;  
       paths[1].pathTester[0]=1;  
       paths[0].pathTester[3]=1;  
       paths[3].pathTester[0]=1;  
       paths[1].pathTester[3]=1;  
       paths[3].pathTester[1]=1;  
      break; 
        … … 
    break; 
 
The indexes of the array paths [ ] show the publisher brokers’ IDs and the indexes of 
pathTester [ ] show the subscriber brokers’ IDs. The initial values stored in a two 
dimensions array called paths [ ].pathTester [ ] are all ZERO. For example, a path 
from Broker 1 to Broker 5 is corresponding to paths [0].pathTester [4]. As long as the 
super path has been written into topicFormula.txt and waits for verifying, all sub 
paths belong to this super path will be regarded as verified as well. For example, if the 
super path from Broker 1 to Broker 3 is verified, all the values stored in paths 
[ ].pathTester [ ] which represent respective sub paths (from Broker 1 to Broker 1, 
from Broker 1 to Broker 2, from Broker 1 to Broker 3, from Broker 2 to Broker 3 and 
all the reversed paths) will be assigned to ONE. A Java class’ file reader goes through 
the topicTable.txt line by line. Firstly, it checks the value stored in respective array 
(paths [ ].pathTester [ ]), based on the indexes numbers, and if the value is ZERO this 
Java class will write this path into a topicFormula.txt file to be verified later, then 
assign the values of sub paths which belong to this path to ONE. This Java class’ file 
reader moves to the next line in topicTable.txt. If the value stored in respective array 
(paths [ ].pathTester [ ]), based on the indexes numbers, is ONE, the Java class’ file 
reader moves to the next line in topicTable.txt directly.  
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Table 5-11错误！未找到引用源。 provides a comparison between using and not using 
the sub-path detection algorithm for the fifty-broker model, illustrating the benefit of 
sub path detection. 
Topic 
numbers 
Average number of paths to 
be tested 
Average time of generating 
NuSMV code (ms) (tested 
over 10000 experiments) 
Sub-path 
detection 
No sub-path 
detection 
Sub-path 
detection 
No sub-path 
detection 
10 8 50 5 7.5 
50 9 250 6 27 
100 9 500 5 71 
200 9 1000 5 265 
300 9 1500 6 601 
500 9 2500 6 1730 
1000 9 5000 7 9230 
Table 5-9Comparing Using and Without Using Sub-path Detection 
In order to validate our sub-path detection mechanism, this research automatically 
generates different numbers of topics and assigns each topic 5 subscribers. From 
Table 5-6, it can be seen that by using our sub-path detection the number of paths to 
be verified and the total time of generation are significantly reduced.  
However, in this thesis the fact that publishers and subscribers can dynamically join 
and leave the MOM system still needs to be considered. Using only CTL and NuSMV, 
real-time systems cannot be verified.  
5.4.1 Generating CTL Specifications in NuSMV for Every 
Stored Topic 
We build a NuSMV model of the delivery process for each topic. After having 
collected the necessary information for NuSMV to create the finite state machine for 
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the MOM overlay network, the CTL specifications for checking the reachability of 
each topic needs to be generated for the input in the NuSMV model. What is verified 
here through CTL specifications is that each message from a certain publisher will 
reach all the required subscribers. The necessary information for building the model 
for each topic is the source broker ID, the destination broker ID and the broker ID of 
the current location. The NuSMV requires the following three state variables:  
src is the source broker ID; 
dest  is the destination broker ID; 
loc is the current location broker ID.  
For example, if Broker 1 is the source of a topic and one of this topic’s destination 
broker is Broker 13 The reachability verification can be represented in a CTL 
specification as: 
( 1 13 1) ( 1 13 13))src dest loc AF src dest loc          
 (5-10) 
 
The CTL specification (5-10) indicates that finally there will be a state where the 
current location of a topic coincides with its destination identification. This means 
that eventually the message will arrive at its destination.  
 
The following pseudo-code describes the algorithm used for generating the NuSMV 
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CTL specifications for every topic managed by the MOM: 
 
1. Initialize matrix F all to FALS E 
2. N:=total number of b rokers  
// For each broker, extract each subscribed topic 
3. For ID   1 to N  
// Extract the subscribed topics of broker ID 
4.      For t   1to Length Of (ID.subscribedTopics) 
5.           TOPIC  ID.subscribedTopic(t) 
6.           IDdest ID 
// Going through all the brokers to extract the publishers of TOPIC 
7.           For IDSourcebroker  1 to N 
// Search and extract the publishers of TOPIC 
8.                For n  1 to LengthOf (IDbroker.publishedTopics) 
9.                     i f TOPIC=IDbroker.publishedTopics(n) 
10.                          then IDsource  IDbroker 
// Check matrix F, will be shown in Formula 5-11, to see if CTL formulas have already been 
written for this path and its sub-paths  
11.                           i f f IDsource, IDdest  != ‘true’ 
12.                           then 
13.                                Write the corresponding CTL formula  
// Search matrix P (formula 5-8) and ext ract the routing path of ,IDsource IDdestp     
14.                                For i  1 to pl  LengthOf ( ,IDsource IDdestp ) 
15.                                     For j  i+1 to pl  
// Go through all the possible hops between IDsource and IDdest 
16.                                        Bsource  , ,IDsource IDdest ip  
17.                                        Bdest      , ,IDsource IDdest jp  
18.                                         f Bsource, Bdest    ‘true’ 
19.                                         f Bdest, Bsource    ‘true’ 
20.                                     End for j 
21.                                End for i  
22.                            else if goes to step 7 
// The path and all sub-paths between IDsource and IDdest for TOPIC have been flagged as ‘true’ 
23.                      End for n  
24.                End for IDSourcebroker 
// All publishers of TOPIC have been searched and written into CTL formulas  
25.           End for t 
// All the subscribed topics of Broker ID were processed 
26.      End for ID 
// All the subscribed topics of all brokers were processed 
// consequently, all CTL formulas for all sources and destinations of all topics have been 
processed 
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Our implemented NuSMV model checker can test all the sources and destinations of a 
topic. If there are a large number of topics, the checker will take a long time to test all 
the source and destination entries. We require that for a pair of source-destination 
brokers, there is a path connecting them based on the routing protocol. However, this 
path could be part of another path or include other paths of other topics. We call a 
path of a topic that completely contains the paths of other topics as a ‘super-path’ and 
the contained paths are ‘sub-paths’. For example, in Figure 5-10, a message that must 
go through a path from Broker 1 to Broker 13, it must go through Broker 16 and 
Broker 17. This path alone has 12 different sub-paths including itself (e.g. the number 
of possible combinations of all possible source and destination pairs). The path of a 
topic could be a sub-path of another already successfully checked path, consequently 
this sub-path need not be tested again.  
With the increasing number of brokers, manually listing all possible paths (as 
presented in [22] for the six-broker model) is no longer feasible. An algorithm that 
can automatically generate all possible paths and find all sub-paths for a tested path is 
required for larger MOM systems. We integrate the detection of sub-paths and already 
processed paths in an algorithm that writes the CTL specification for each topic, 
significantly decreasing the overall testing time. In the algorithm, a matr ix F is created 
to store the states indicating if a CTL specification has been already written for a 
specific path (source-destination pair) or not. In this matrix, if for a specific 
source–destination path a CTL specification has been written then the corresponding 
value is set to ‘true’, otherwise the value is ‘false’. Rows in matrix F indicate the 
source of a path, columns indicates the destinations of the path, and the corresponding 
Boolean value indicates whether a verification check for that path has been conducted 
or not.  
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 
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                (5-11) 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
The primary disadvantage of many MOM systems is that they require an extra 
component in the architecture, the message transfer agent (i.e. the message broker). 
As with any system, adding another component can lead to a reduction in 
performance and reliability, and can also make the system as a whole more difficult 
and expensive to maintain. The goal to this research is to find a suitable means to 
retain the performance and reliability for a MOM system after a failure.  
This work provides a code generator to automatically generate a MOM overlay 
checker when the links and topics of each broker are provided. Then the reachability 
of all topics is tested and loops within the topology are detected. The configuration 
could be manual. Normally this would be automatic, but manual override by the user 
is permitted. As such, our work is essential for detecting ‘human errors’. Moreover, if 
some paths or brokers fail (or as a result of a misconfiguration), our checker quickly 
locates the failure and informs the user. 
In this research, the routing table is generated based on the shortest path algorithm 
although it is possible to verify the contents of the table no matter how it is created 
(i.e. including static entries). In future work, we will provide more requisites for 
verifying a realistic MOM system. One of them is the ability to verify the reachability 
of topics when no predefined routing table is available. Moreover, since many MOM 
systems are expected to provide an efficient and high quality messaging service, 
another important requisite is to check if the rules for guaranteeing that end-to-end 
latency constraints are met by every broker. However, these new features are for 
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future work. 
This chapter has described a methodology for implementing a means of 
model-checking MOM systems models. Three MOM systems models (three-broker 
model, six-broker model and 50-broker model) have been presented. The first two 
models focus on different aspects of configuration and reconfiguration of a MOM 
overlay network. The three-broker model is used to implement verifying following 
aspects: 
 Each publisher should have at least one subscriber who subscribes the topic this 
publisher published. 
 Each subscriber should have at least one publisher who publishes the topic this 
subscriber interested in.  
 After a broker failed, all the end nodes should be translated to the neighbouring 
brokers of the failure broker until this failure broker performs normally.  
The six-broker model is used to implement verifying the reachability of each topic 
and detecting the loops within a MOM overlay network based on the routing table and 
topic table of this MOM system. 
In order to provide a scalable verification mechanism that can cope with requirements 
of larger commercial MOM systems, the third model is introduced, comprising fifty 
brokers. This work develops then a code generator to automatically generate a MOM 
overlay checker model whereby the link table of the brokers and the topic table for 
each broker are collected by a user-friendly GUI interface. Then the reachability of all 
topics is tested and any loops within the topology are detected.  
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Although configurations could be automatically generated, manual intervention by 
administrators are not untypical. Therefore a means of verifying the configuration 
data is essential. A new configuration can be prepared by the administrator based on 
the feedback provided by the model checker. The code generator that this research has 
developed allows any user to build a model checker for a MOM based 
publish/subscribe system, even if the user has little knowledge of programming 
languages or of NuSMV. 
As the number of brokers increases, manually generating routing tables for a 
large-scale MOM system becomes extreme ly complex. As mentioned before, Code 
Generator, which is proposed by this research, can assist administrators to build a 
model. By using the tool, users can simply input link information of the brokers, 
which is much easier to provide than a complete rout ing table, and the tool 
automatically generates a model from this link information. In this research, the 
routing table is generated based on the shortest path algorithm although it is possible 
to verify the contents of the table no matter how it is create d (i.e. including static 
entries).  
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6 Fast Recovery from Overlay Network 
Failures 
In previous chapters, this thesis has presented methods for formally verifying topic 
reachability and loop free detection. These methods focus on guarantying correct 
configuration before launching the whole system. However, during the 
communication phase, brokers located at different geographical areas may suffer from 
unexpected failure of a broker or overlay link. Although, normally the possibility of a 
link failed is low and simultaneous links/nodes failure are much rarer [3, 4, 20, 21], a 
resilient system should provide measures to ameliorate failure scenarios. A mission 
critical message oriented middleware application, which this research based on, 
requires a reliable and efficient messages delivery mechanism [103, 104]. Messages 
are time sensitive so it is necessary to employ an overlay network fast recovery 
scheme. Given the growing size and complexity of mission critical MOM overlay 
networks, the presence of component failures can be an everyday occurrence [124]. 
Hence, considerable attention has been paid to the problem of fast recovery from link 
failures.  
In order to recover quickly from a network failure, some researchers have proposed 
reducing the failure detection time whilst others have focused on saving time 
associated with processing state update packets, calculating new routing tables and 
forwarding.  
For one of the most wildly used network routing protocols Open Shorted Path First, if 
a router does not receive a Hello message from its neighbour within a 
RouterDeadInterval (typically 40 seconds or 4 HelloIntervals), it assumes the link 
between itself and the neighbouring node to be down. Therefore, Goyal et al. [105] 
proposed optimizing the HelloInterval such that fast failure detection in the network is 
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possible whilst keeping the false alarm occurrences within acceptable limits. However, 
the HelloInterval is expressed in ‘seconds’, so the minimum detection time will be 4 
seconds. For a mission critical MOM application, a delay of 4 seconds will still be 
intolerable. 
Quite a few proposals attempt to handle link failures as locally as possible, by only 
undertaking routing updates in a limited number of routers near the point of failure, 
such as [106]. This proposa l announces that if two equal cost paths exist towards a 
destination, traffic can safely be switched from one to the other in case of a failure. 
Similarly, Iselt et al. [107] propose using Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) 
tunnels to make sure that there always are two equal cost paths towards a destination 
at every node. Other proposals consider the situation from a global perspective, and 
try to guarantee that there always is a valid routing entry for a given destination even 
after a failure. With O2-routing [108], the routing tables are set up so that there are 
always two valid next hops toward a destination. However, the proposal does not 
guarantee the shortest path. Hansen et al. [109] propose that for a given network 
topology, there could be several layers with different safe nodes and safe links. Most 
nodes and links will only appear in one layer. If a failure arises in a particular layer, 
the cost of all the links within this layer is set to infinity. Therefore, each node just 
needs to store a routing table for normal operations and for each layer failure 
situation.  
In order to recover rapidly from failure, this thesis proposed a Pre-Calculated Routing 
Tables (PCRT) algorithm. All the routing tables for normal and different failure 
scenarios are calculated in advance to save the time by avoiding the need to update a 
Link State Database (LSD) in response to topology changes triggering reactive 
flooding of Link State Advertisements (LSAs), and the subsequent calculation of new 
routing tables. Other than sending LSD flooding messages and exchanging Hello 
messages, another advantage for this PCRT algorithm is employing the exchange of 
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regular Heartbeat messages with a ‘colour’ flag, the colour indicating the state of the 
network (i.e. in terms of which links are operational) as perceived by the sender. In 
our scheme, all the pre-calculated routing tables have a one-to-one mapping onto a 
colour with global significance; that is, all brokers know that a particular colour is 
uniquely associated with a particular combination of operational and failed links for 
the MOM topology. If a broker receives a Heartbeat message with different colour 
and larger sequence number from its own, or if a local failure is detected, an update 
mechanism is triggered and updated Heartbeat messages will be generated.   
6.1 Pre-Calculated Routing Tables Scheme  
In a typical OSPF network, with a HelloInterval value of 10 seconds and 
RouterDeadInterval of 40 seconds, the failure detection can take anywhere between 
30 to 40 seconds. The LSA flooding times consist of transmission and propagation 
delays and any delay resulting from the rate-limiting of LSA Update packets sent 
down an interface. Once a router receives a new LSA, it schedules an SPF calculation. 
Since SPF calculations using Dijkstra’s algorithm [115] constitute a significant 
processing load, the router waits for some time (spfDelay - typically 5 seconds) for 
other arriving LSAs to trigger an SPF calculation. Moreover, routers place a limit on 
the frequency of SPF calculations (governed by spfHoldTime, typically 10 seconds 
between successive SPF calculations), which can introduce further delays.   
The rationale behind the PCRT scheme is to perform all the time consuming 
calculations before placing the MOM network enters its operational state. There is no 
Hello message or LSA flooding in the PCRT scheme. Instead a new type of message, 
called a Heartbeat is introduced. Since the topology of a MOM network does not 
change frequently and the total number of brokers is normally less than f ifty [104], 
this research does not employ Hello messages to build adjacencies between 
neighbouring brokers. With PCRT, besides the forwarding of data messages, 
Heartbeat messages are periodically sent between adjacent brokers to detect link 
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failure(s) and keep network state information synchronized.  
At time zero, all the routing tables for each broker for all the possible / supported 
failure scenarios and the default normal conditions are automatically generated and 
then condensed and distributed to the brokers. In addition, colours and corresponding 
failures are associated by means of a shared list. Thus each possible entry in the 
condensed super routing table at a broker is located with appropriate colour and utility 
destination, corresponding to a given overlay topological state.  
6.1.1 Super Broker 
PCRT is a pre-calculated algorithm. One of the brokers, referred to as the ‘super 
broker’, is used during the configuration phase to pre-calculate the routing tables for 
both normal and failures situations for each broker, which are then condensed and 
sent to that appropriate broker. The super broker knows the complete topology of the 
network. An example topology is illustrated in Figure 6-1. 
 
Figure 6-1 Example Three-Broker Topology 
In this thesis, our research considers single link failures to explain our algorithm and 
validation was performed using a bespoke Pascal-based simulation tool. The structure 
of Super Link State Database (SLSD) is shown in Figure 6-2. 
For each topology, the PCRT algorithm generates an SLSD listing of all the brokers, 
shown on the left. On the right-hand side, the directly connected neighbouring brokers 
to those brokers are shown in Figure 6-2.  
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Figure 6-2Super Link State Database 
6.1.2 Routing Table Generation under Normal and Failure 
Conditions 
Current Sequence Number List  
A broker current sequence-number list exists in every broker. It is a list of all the 
nodes/brokers in a network and most recently observed sequence-number 
corresponding to each node/broker. Initially, each broker’s sequence-number is set to 
‘1’. When a change (i.e. a failure or recovery) happens, nodes/brokers adjacent to the 
affected links will increase their sequence number by one and immediately send flood 
notification messages with the new colour (based on the revised perceived topology 
state) and sequence-number to their neighbouring nodes/brokers. When a sequence 
number reaches its largest permitted value, after next change ha ppens, it is reset to 1.  
Current Colour 
Each broker stores the current colour of the network, indicating the network state, as 
it perceives it. If a broker receives a flood notification message (this is one of the 
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heartbeat messages and will be introduced in later Section 6.1.3) with a different 
colour from its own current colour, it will compare the sequence number listed in this 
flood notification message with the one in its current sequence number list. If the 
sequence number stored in the flood notification message is greater/newer than the 
number stored in the sequence number list, this broker will update the sequence 
number list with this new number and search the colour lookup table to determine the 
failure/failures which relate to this new colour. Together with its own knowledge of 
failure/failures, this broker will take note of all the failure/failures existing in this 
network and then lookup the corresponded colour to become the new current colour 
(by checking the colour lookup table). This new colour may be different from the 
received one as multiple failures could arise concurrently, unbeknown to the broker 
sending a particular message. Then the receiving broker forwards flood notification 
messages to its neighbouring brokers except the one where this flood notification 
message came from but a flood ACK message is sent in this case. Otherwise, if the 
sequence stored in this flood notification message is equal to or less/earlier than the 
sequence number listed in the broker’s sequence number list, th is broker will discard 
this flood notification message and send a flood ACK message to the sender of the 
discarded flood notification message’s source. 
Conversely, if a broker receives a flood notification message with the same colour as 
its own current colour, it compares the sequence number listed in this Notification 
message with its own record of the sender’s sequence number. If the sequence 
number stored in this Notification message is greater/newer than the number stored in 
the sequence numbers list, this node/broker will update the sequence-number list with 
this new number and forward this flood notification message along egress interfaces 
except the one on which this Notification message arrived. Otherwise, this 
node/broker discards the flood notification message and sends back a flood ACK 
message (introduced in Section 6.1.3).  
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Generating a Super Routing Table  
After the Super Broker generates all the routing tables, a routing table set will be 
generated for each broker where each routing table unique ly corresponds to one 
colour (associated with a particular link state configuration). These routing table sets 
are only a temporary data-structure held at the Super Broker; they are not distributed 
to the remaining brokers but are simply used as an interim step in the construction the 
Condensed Super Routing Table for each broker.  
The following pseudo-code shows how the routing tables for each different colour are 
generated. The original link state database (LSD) holds the complete topology and 
provides a reference template. We generate clones of this LSD which we modify 
based on specific failure scenarios we wish to handle. These modified clones are used 
to make specific Shortest Path Trees and thus routing tables for the brokers for the 
failure condition being considered.  
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Table 6-1 and Table 6-2 are examples of routing tables temporarily created in 
sequence at the Super Broker to permit the construction of the condensed super 
routing table for broker 1 which are based on the topology shown in Figure 6-1. 
Colour 1 Colour 2 
Ult. 
Destination 
broker 
Next 
hop 
broker  
Ult. 
Destination 
broker 
Next hop 
broker  
2 2 2 3 
3 3 3 3 
1. Initialize the link state database Super_LSD 
2. Initialize a global integer variable Colour =1 
3. //Generate routing table fo r normal situation 
4. while (Super_LSD has next node) 
5.       updateRT(node) 
6.       Associate this routing table with Colour  
7.       Move to next node 
8. end while  
9. Colour = Colour  + 1 
10. //Generate routing tables for all the single link failu re situations 
11. while (Super_LSD has next node) 
12.       while (d irectLinkedNode has next) 
13.             if (directLinkedNode_ID>Node_ID) 
14.                   Clone_LSD   Super_LSD 
15.                   Fail the links between directLinkedNode_ID and Node_ID 
16.                    while (Clone_LSD has next node) 
17.                           updateRT(node) 
18.                           Associate this routing table with Colour 
19.                            Associate this failure with Colour 
20.                            Move to the next node 
21.                    end while 
22.                    Dispose(Clone_LSD) 
23.               end if 
24.               Move to next direct linked node 
25.               Co lour = Colour + 1 
26.         end while  
27. end while  
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Table 6-1Routing Tables for Broker 1 (Part 1) 
 
 
Colour 3 Colour 4 
Ult. 
Destination 
broker 
Next 
hop 
broker  
Ult. 
Destination 
broker 
Next hop 
broker  
2 2 2 2 
3 2 3 3 
Table 6-2 Routing Tables for Broker 1 (Part 2) 
 
Table 6-3 shows the ‘colour and failure mapping table ’ where a one-to-one mapping 
between a colour and a specific failure situation are listed. Here we confine ourselves 
to single link failures as an example to keep the explanation simple. A failure link 
between broker i  and broker j , where  , 1,2,3i j , can be represented as ( , )F i j . 
Colour Failure 
1 None 
2 (1,2)F  
3 (1,3)F  
4 (2,3)F  
Table 6-3 Colour and Failure Mapping Table fo r Three-Brokers Topology 
This so-called ‘colour and failure mapping table’ is a list of mapping from colours to 
failures. One colour is uniquely mapped onto a particular failure or a combination of 
failures. The reverse mapping is also true. This will be copied and stored in all the 
nodes/brokers so they will have the same ‘dictionary’ of colours and failures. There 
are two parts to this table. The colours are represented by several bits, which depend  
on the total number of links in the network and the number of failure combinations 
that are to be protected against. Then the remainder of this table stores the failures and 
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the combination of failures corresponding to each colour.  
Based on Table 6-1, 6-2 and Table 6-3, all the different combinations of destination 
broker and next hop broker are used to form the following super routing table. In this 
super routing table, shown in Table 6-4, all possible entries for message processing at 
broker 1 for all considered failure situations are represented.  
 
 
 
 
1. Assume there are N brokers 
2. Routing tables set for broker n: ‘RTsSet(n)’ where 0<n<=N 
3. n  1 
4. Let SuperRT(n) be the super condensed routing table for broker n 
5. Boolean addEntry=True 
6. while (n<=N) 
7.      while (RTsSet(n) has next entry) 
8.           while (SuperRT(n) has next entry) 
9.                if (RTsSet_E==SuperRT_E) 
10.                     Add the corresponded colour of RTsSet_E to 
SuperRT_E states  link 
11.                     addEntry=False; 
12.                     break ; 
13.                end if 
14.           end while 
15.           if(addEntry==True) 
16.                Add REsSet_E to the end of SuperRT(n); 
17.           end if 
18.           else 
19.                addEntry=True; 
20.           end else 
21.      end while 
22. n++ 
23. end while 
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Super routing table 
Address Ult. Destination 
broker 
Next hop 
broker 
Colour 
1 2 2 1,3,4 
2 3 3 1,2,4 
3 2 3 2 
4 3 2 3 
Table 6-4 Super Routing Table for Broker 1 
Rather than storing four routing tables in Broker 1, one condensed super routing table 
is constructed whereby redundant/ duplicate entries are omitted. Let N  be the total 
number of brokers in a topology and iL is the number of directly linked 
broker/brokers of broker i , while 1 i N  . So there are ( 1)N  destinations for 
messages processing in broker i . The worst case of a super routing table contains 
maximum Max different entries: 
 ( 1) iMax N L    (6-1) 
The compete PCRT initialisation phase is shown in Figure 6-3. 
Topology Database
Clone
Database
Automatic
Failure
Generator
Dijkstra
SPF
Calculation
Table
CondenserRouting Table
Set for Node i
Lookup
Array
Super
Routing
Table
Dispatch
to Node i
Super Broker
 
 
Figure 6-3 PCRT In itialisation Phase 
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The super node uses the true topology database to generate a series of clone databases, 
each with a specific combination of failures and assigns each one a unique ‘colour’ 
identifier. Dijkstra is then performed on each clone database to generate an 
appropriate SPF routing table for every node in the overlay network. Once Dijkstra 
has been performed for all the considered clone database failures, each node has a set 
of routing tables, one for each colour state. The table condenser function then 
removes redundant (duplicate) information, resulting in a single much condense super 
routing table for a given node. In addition a 2-dimensional array provides a simple 
means of accessing the appropriate entry within the super routing table. In many 
instances, separate entries in the array (associated with differing failure conditions) 
will point to the same routing information in the super routing table. 
6.1.3 Heartbeat Messages 
The Heartbeat message is a new entity proposed in our PCRT algorithm, which is 
periodically sent to each broker’s neighbouring broker/brokers to detect failures and 
update the latest topology structure. Figure 6-4 illustrates the structure of the 
Heartbeat message. There are three parts to the message. The first part is called ‘type 
flag’ containing three possible types of a Heartbeat message, namely: flood 
notification message, test link notification message and regular heartbeat message. 
The ‘Acknowledgement (ACK) flag’ is a Boolean variable to show if this Heartbeat 
message is a response to a certain type of a previous received message. The last part, 
‘packet information’, may contain network change information when a change (path 
failure or path recovery) happens or maybe null if it is just a regular Heartbeat 
message.  
 
Figure 6-4 Heartbeat Packet Structure 
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Regular Heartbeat Message 
Heartbeat messages are periodically exchanged between adjacent brokers. These 
normal Heartbeat messages have ‘type’ showing regular Heartbeat and ‘ACK flag’ set 
to FALSE and the ‘packet information’ part null, are used to detect change of link 
status. Regular Heartbeat messages are sent periodically and if a broker has not 
received any Heartbeat message for a specified dead-interval, the link will be assumed 
to be ‘dead’ and the state of that link interface will be set to ‘failure’. Then this broker 
immediately generates a corresponding flood notification message and sends it to 
neighbouring broker/brokers along all operational interfaces. Conversely, if a node 
receives any kind of Heartbeat message from a ‘failed’ link, our scheme will test to 
see if this link has stably recovered by sending link test notification message whilst 
keeping the link state as ‘failure’. There are three states for each interface and they are 
‘normal’, ‘waiting’ and ‘failure’. If an interface receives any type of Heartbeat 
message within the dead time interval, the dead time interval will be renewed to its 
largest number, similar to OSPF. In this situation, if this interface is in the state 
‘normal’, it will continue to be ‘normal’; if the state of this interface is ‘failure’, it will 
send a link test message. If a matched link test ACK received then it will be set to 
‘normal’; if the state is ‘waiting’; only when a matched ACK is received, the state 
will change to ‘normal’. If an interface has not received any type of Heartbeat 
message before the dead time interval reaches ‘0’, the link for this interface will be set 
to ‘failure’ whilst continuing to wait for a Heartbeat message. If an interface needs to 
send out a flood notification message, the state of this interface will be set to ‘waiting’. 
In this state, this interface periodically sends flood notification messages unt il a 
suitable ACK, with the right copy of the sent flood notification message, is received.  
Flood Notification Message 
A flood notification message will be generated only when a node detects a change of 
one of its adjacent links and will be sent to all the directly connected neighbouring 
brokers. At the same time, each link’s state will be set to ‘waiting’ if it is previously 
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in the ‘normal’ state. This flood notification message’s copies will be stored into each 
interface’s ACK waiting list and a corresponding ACK timer for each copy in 
different interfaces will be initialized. If a matching ACK message is been received 
within the ACK time, the corresponding flood notification message will be removed 
from the ACK waiting list, otherwise another copy of the flood notification message 
will be sent out through that interface to make sure this change can be learnt properly. 
Only when the ACK waiting list is empty, the state of that interface will be returned 
to ‘normal’ again.  
It should be noted that an ACK list is needed for each interface as multiple changes 
may arise causing several flood notification messages to be emitted prior to any 
acknowledgements. Each flooded message must therefore be matched to a specific 
ACK message 
Other brokers who receive a valid flood notification message forward this message to 
all their neighbouring brokers apart from the one sending this message. Nothing in the 
‘packet information’ section will be changed when forwarding the message. A 
corresponding flood notification ACK will be sent back through the interface on 
which it was received no matter if this flood notification message is up-to-date or not. 
For a flood ACK message, the packet information section will remain the same as the 
original flood notification message, other than the ACK flag being set. A timer 
(ack_timer) for this flood message starts and is added to an ‘ack_list record’ prepared 
for each interface. Each flood message has its own ack_timer. If the interface does not 
receive a matched flood ack message while the ack_timer goes to ‘0’, this interface 
will resend the corresponded flood message again and reset the ack_timer. If the 
interface receives a matched flood ack message before the ack_timer goes to ‘0’, this 
record stored in ‘ack_list record’ will be deleted. 
When a broker confirms a change (i.e. a failure or a recovery) has happened, it will go 
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through the following steps: 
 Check the failure lookup table, find the colour, which corresponds to this failure 
or recovery, and update its CurrentC to the appropriate colour and increase its 
own SequenceNo by one.  
 Generate flood notification messages with CurrentC, NodeID and SequenceNo 
written into the ‘packet information’ section. The ‘type’ field shows ‘flood’ and 
‘ACK flag’ is set FALSE. These new flood notificat ion messages are sent to all 
the directly connected neighbouring brokers even through the ‘failure’ link (in 
case it recovers).. 
Link Test Notification Message 
A test link notification message is generated when a message is received along a link 
that has been considered to be a ‘failure’. For a robust system, it is necessary to have a 
mechanism to double check whether a link is fully recovered from a failure. This 
research proposes a method of sending a test link notification message through the 
‘failed’ link and waiting for a response from the broker on the other end to make sure 
the link is functioning well by return of a specific acknowledgement.  
ACK Messages 
There are three different types of Heartbeat message, so there could be three 
corresponding ACK messages. However, for the regular Heartbeat message, a 
response is not expected. In future work, the research could use the combination of 
regular Heartbeat notification massage with ACK flag ‘TRUE’ to be a message which 
can record Round Trip Time [116] as in Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) to help 
dynamically configure the expiry timer in our algorithm. Table 6-5 shows the 
meaning of each message / acknowledgement combination.  
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Type list ACK flag ACK type 
Flood TRUE Flood notification ACK message 
LinkTest TRUE Link test ACK message 
Heart-beat TRUE Round Trip Time test message 
Table 6-5 List of All Ack Message Types  
The packet information field in an ACK message is the same as the one in a 
notification message. The current colour, broker ID and the latest sequence number of 
that broker are listed in the packet information section. When a broker receives a 
Heartbeat message with ‘flood’ and ‘TRUE’ in the TYPE and ACK tag fields, 
respectively, it means that this is an ACK message responding to a flood notification 
message from a neighbouring broker. This broker will compare the information this 
message holds with its own knowledge in ACK list. If the ACK message matches the 
record in this interface’s ACK list, the record will be removed. If a link test 
notification message is received through an interface, this broker will generate a link 
test ACK message sending it back through that interface. At the same time, if this 
interface is associated with a ‘failure’ and this is the first Heart-beat message that this 
interface received after the failure has happened, a link test notification message will 
be sent through that interface.  
6.2 Node/Broker Operation with PCRT 
For each interface in a node/broker, there are three different states: normal, waiting 
and failure. The transitions between those states are shown in Figure 6-5.  
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Normal
Failure Waiting
Receive any kinds of Heart-beat 
message within the dead interval; 
Reset the dead interval.
Receive none Heart-
beat message within 
the dead interval or 
haven’t received 
link test ack
Receive none matching 
ACK Heart-beat message 
within the dead interval; 
Reset the dead interval.
Receive none matching ACK 
Heart-beat message within the 
dead interval
Receive any kinds of 
Heart-beat message; 
and a link test ack 
received as well. 
Reset dead interval
Receive none 
Heart-beat 
message within 
the dead 
interval
Receive a matching 
ACK Heart-beat 
message within the 
dead interval; Reset 
the dead interval.
A change happens, 
flood notification 
message generated, 
an ack_timer starts, 
a record added
 
Figure 6-5 Interface States Transition Diagram 
Each node has its own count down timer (the counting_down_timer automatically 
counts down based on the system timer) to periodically send out normal Heart-beat 
messages. When this timer reaches the value of ‘0’, it will send out normal Heart-beat 
message through all interfaces irrespective of their current status. Then the timer 
returns to its maximum value to restart the countdown.  
There are other timers in a node/broker. For all interfaces, they have 
(dead_time_interval) timers to check how long they haven’t receive any thing and 
trigger further procedures. The max value of a dead_time_interval is four times the 
counting_down_timer (the same as OSPF’s mechanism). If any kind of Heart-beat 
message is received by an interface, the dead_time_interval will be reset to its 
maximum value. If not, the dead_time_interval will continue to count down one unit 
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at a time until it reaches ‘0’. When dead_time_interval equals to ‘0’, this interface 
will go to the ‘failure’ state. An interface will remain in the ‘failure’ state until a Link 
test ACK message is rece ived and it will then return the to ‘normal’ state.  
When a node/broker detects a change, it sends out flood messages along all the 
necessary interfaces (introduced in the previous section). Each interface then goes to 
the state ‘waiting’ or remains there. A timer (ack_timer) for this flood message starts 
and is added to an ‘ack_list record’ prepared for each interface. Each flood message 
has its own ack_timer. If the interface does not receive a matched flood ack message 
while the ack_timer goes to ‘0’, this interface will resend the corresponded flood 
message again and reset the ack_timer. If the interface receives a matched flood ack 
message before the ack_timer goes to ‘0’, this record stored in ‘ack_list record’ will 
be deleted. This repeats until the ‘ack_list record’ if empty, the state will go back to 
normal. It should be noted that an ack list is needed for each interface as multiple 
changes make arise during the time the first flood message is sent. Each flooded 
message must therefore be matched to a specific ack message.  
Figure 6-6 provides a flowchart giving further details of the interface behaviour when 
it receives a heart-beat message:  
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message part; Interface_state=waiting
Is Notif_seq > list_seq ?
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table’find the colour 
correspounds to the set of 
failure (PF ˄ CF)
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Yes
No
Let 
list_seq=Notif_seq
Yes
Is Notif_seq > list_seq ?
Yes
No
No
Forward this  flood 
notification message to the 
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start a ack timer
Is it regular 
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A interface receives a heart-beat 
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interface
Waiting for Heart-
beat messages
Yes
Yes
Assuming the link for this inerface is 
dead generate flood notification 
message to all the interfaces. 
Interface_state=’failure’.
Is it flood 
notification 
message?
No
No
No
Yes
Interface_state= 
‘Normal’
Is 
Interface_state=
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Delete the record in 
‘ack_list record’
Is the ACK 
message is the same 
as an ACK record 
in this node
No
Yes
No
Yes
Waiting for Heart-
beat messages
Forward this  flood 
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Periodiclly 
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to that interface
Interface_state= 
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Is the ‘ack_list 
record empty?’
Yes
No
 
Figure 6-6 Flowchart for Interface Behaviour 
The following pseudo-code shows how the overlay network reconverges when a 
change happens. 
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1. A node detected an adjacent link failure ‘NewF’ 
2. If CurrentC==1 
3. //CurrentC is the current colour of this node 
4.       PreFail   ColourLookupTable(CurrentC) 
5.       If NewF∈PreFail 
6.            NodeID.SequNo= NodeID.SequNo +1 
7.             Heart-beat message (CurrentC, NodeID.SequNo,  ) 
8.       End if 
9.       Else  
10.             Failure=NewF U PreFail 
11.             Colour  FailureLookupTable(Failure) 
12.             RoutingTable  RTsSet(Colour) 
13.             NodeID.SequNo= NodeID.SequNo +1 
14.             Heart-beat message (CurrentC, NodeID.SequNo,  )  
15.       End else 
16. End if  
17. Else 
18.       CurrentC   FailureLookupTable(Failure) 
19.       RoutingTable  RTsSet(CurrentC) 
20.       NodeID.SequNo= NodeID.SequNo +1 
21.       Heart-beat message (CurrentC, NodeID.SequNo,  )  
22. End else 
23. A node detected an adjacent link failure ‘NewF’ 
24. If CurrentC==1 
25. //CurrentC is the current colour of this node 
26.       PreFail   ColourLookupTable(CurrentC) 
27.       If NewF∈PreFail 
28.            NodeID.SequNo= NodeID.SequNo +1 
29.             Heart-beat message (CurrentC, NodeID.SequNo,  )  
30.       End if 
31.       Else  
32.             Failure=NewF U PreFail 
33.             Colour  FailureLookupTable(Failure) 
34.             RoutingTable  RTsSet(Colour) 
35.             NodeID.SequNo= NodeID.SequNo +1 
36.             Heart-beat message (CurrentC, NodeID.SequNo,  )  
37.       End else 
38. End if  
39. Else 
40.       CurrentC   FailureLookupTable(Failure) 
41.       RoutingTable  RTsSet(CurrentC) 
42.       NodeID.SequNo= NodeID.SequNo +1 
43.       Heart-beat message (CurrentC, NodeID.SequNo,  )  
44. End else 
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6.3 Simulation Results 
Some researchers who focus on optimizing networks, express concerns that 
pre-calculating all possible routing tables and storing them in routers could lead to a 
router ‘out of memory’ problem or slower performance [210]. This thesis proposes to 
condense routing tables and remove redundant entities, so each broker will only need 
to store a single super condensed routing table.  
A broker is an application platform, which needs to be embedded into a third part 
container. The memory that the broker is allowed to use is not determined by the 
amount of memory allocated to the platform (i.e. it could be a Java Virtual Machine). 
Although the broker is constrained by the amount of memory given to the platform, 
the broker manages its memory independently. If any issues with an OutOfMemory 
were to happen, the administrator could increase the broker storage memory and 
additional data storage files until reach the limit of the container. Normally the 
container (being a server/PC) can have quite a large memory capacity. 
Potentially, each broker would require its own routing tables set for both normal and 
failures situations. If there were n links, including all single link failure situations and 
the normal situation, there would be (n+1) routing tables. However, we propose 
constructing a condensed super routing table with all possible unique entries from 
those (n+1) routing tables. Redundant entries are omitted, saving space; so our main 
concern becomes the fast selection of the suitable next hop entry for arriving 
messages.  
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Figure 6-7 PCRT Selection Mechanism 
This thesis considers two different selection mechanisms. One is a well-known 
hardware device called a content-addressable memory (CAM) and another is a 
two-dimensional array data-structure. 
A CAM provides a lookup table function within a single clock cycle by using 
dedicated comparison circuitry. It compares input search data against a table with 
pre-stored data, and then returns the address of the matched data [117, 118]. 
Nowadays, the most popular commercial application of CAMs is for classifying and 
forwarding Internet Protocol (IP) packets in network routers [119, 120].  
However, instead of employing expensive hardware equipment, here this thesis we 
focus on a proposal using a software data-structure, i.e. a two-dimension array, to 
locate the address in the pre-stored lookup table corresponding to the matched input 
data. Without using CAM to compare input data with data stored in lookup table, a 
two-dimensional array will assist locating the address of the data without the need for 
a search operation.  In this two-dimensional array, the first dimens ion indicates the 
current colour and the second dimension shows the destination broker. Based on the 
condensed super routing table, the two-dimension array is filled with a pointer to the 
appropriate next hop entry in the condensed super routing table. The use of a pointer 
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into the routing table, rather than storing the next-hop entry directly in the 
2-dimensional array is that more complex records are held in the routing table, such as 
counters, link state information and so forth.  
The following is the structure of the two-dimension array.  
1,1 1,2 1,
. ker
2,1 2,2 2,
,1 ,2 ,
...
...
... ... ... ...
...
Colour
n
Dest Bro
n
m m m n
a a a
a a a
A
a a a


 
 
 
 
 
  
             (6-2) 
Given the topology shown in Figure 6-1) as an example, the lookup two-dimension 
array will be the following and number 1 represents this broker itself.  
. ker
1 1 1 1
2 3 2 2
3 3 2 3
Colour
Dest Bro
A


 
 

 
  
                (6-3)
 
Figure 6-8 shows how the combination of the 2-D lookup array and a single 
condensed routing table provides an efficient data structure arrangement. Multiple 
colour / destinations can be mapped to a single next hop entry. In addition no 
searching of the routing table is undertaken. Providing the index information (i.e. the 
broker’s current colour and the packet’s ultimate destination) into the array quickly 
obtains the appropriate pointer that is then used to obtain the next hop infor mation.  
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Figure 6-8 Relationship between 2D Lookup Array and Condensed Routing Table showing Many to 
One Mapping 
The super broker prepares the routing tables for different failure situations for all 
nodes, followed by the creation of the condensed super routing table and the lookup 
two-dimensional array. This is relatively time-consuming. However, as this is 
performed during initialisation, this is of little consequence. Our concern is whether it 
is time consuming to find the right next hop entry via this array. Figure 6-8 shows the 
time, in milliseconds on a computer with an Intel i3 CPU, M 350 @ 2.27GHz and 
2.00 GB RAM, of accessing different sized two-dimensional arrays a million times.  
We can see from this figure, for running the lookup once, it will take average seconds. 
This time for searching once is so small we can thus ignore it.  
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Figure 6-9 Time for locating the right address in two-dimensional arrays 
 
6.3.1 Shortest Path First Guarantee 
A mission critical MOM overlay network, such as a stock market application, could 
exist over quite a large geographical area or maybe worldwide. Between two brokers, 
an overlay link may be supported by long underlying network path. Therefore, to 
guarantee the shortest path first routing in the overlay is highly desirable. One hop 
more in the overlay network might lead to a message traversing a considerably longer 
physical distance. Compared with many proposed network recovery algorithms, to 
our knowledge, our scheme is the only one that guarantees shortest path when 
building the routing table for various failure situations. Figure 6-10 shows a 
comparison of path length for a 32 node - 64 link network for different network 
recovery abstractions.  
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Figure 6-10 Path Length of a 32 Nodes, 64 Links Topology 
Experiments are based on single link failure for a 32 nodes and 64 links network 
topology. By failing links one per time, we can ca lculate the total number of each 
different path length and then calculate each path length’s percentage among all the 
paths. From Figure 6-10, it can be seen that the proposed PCRT recovery method is 
most closely matches the failure free situation which is to say our algorithm has a 
better performance in providing the shortest paths than the other schemes considered 
[210].  
Although Resilient Routing Layers (RRL)[110] claims to scale well and shows 
several results to indicate that six layers are more than enough to support a very large 
network (1024 nodes and an average node degree of 4), our proposed algorithm, 
PCRT, only needs one condensed super routing table to cover all possible situations. 
Moreover, the most important shortcoming of RRL is that it cannot guarantee the 
shortest path at all when a failure happens and the fewer routing layers there are the 
higher the possibility of employing longer paths. This is the trade off of RRL—less 
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routing tables or shorter paths.  
Figures 6-11 and 6-12 show a comparison between the average routing entries stored 
at a node without using condensed super routing table and the number of entries for 
that node when the condensed super routing table is employed. The difference 
between Figure 6-11 and Figure 6-12 is the scale of y-axis. In the Figure 6-11, y-axis 
is exponentially distributed and the y-axis is distributed in the Figure 6-12 according 
to the average.  
 
Figure 6-11A Comparison between the Average Entries for Different Measurements (part 1)  
 
Figure 6-11 indicates that with increasing of number of brokers, the average number 
of entries increases in those two different measures The average entries a node will 
store without using condensed super routing table is always greater than the average 
entries this node can have when the condensed super routing table is applied.  
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Figure 6-12 A Comparison between the Average Entries for Different Measurements (part 2) 
From Figure 6-12, the increasing trend of those two lines under different 
measurements are shown clearly. The average number of entries a node will store 
without using a condensed super routing table will grow exponentially with an 
increasing number of brokers [100] and the average entries this node can have when 
the condensed super routing table is applied results in linear growth [100].  
Let N  be the total number of brokers, D  be the average degree of the given 
topology and L be the total number of links this given overlay network has. Now, for 
the single link failure only situations, the total number of routing tables RTs  will 
be: 
 
1RTs L   (6-4) 
because there are L  different failures possibility and one routing table for the 
normal situation.  
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In a routing table, every broker, except the broker storing this routing table, will be 
listed as a reachable entry. Therefore, the total entries E  a routing table can have 
will be: 
 
1E N   (6-5) 
Since the average degree of the given topology is known, the total number of links of 
this topology will be: 
 
2L N D    (6-6) 
Based on Formula 6-3 and Formula 6-6, the total number of routing tables will be: 
 
2 1RTs N D     (6-7) 
So the total number of entries E  of all the routing tables a broker needs to store 
will be: 
 
1
N
i
i
E E RTs E

     (6-8) 
Based on the Formula 6-7 and Formula 6-5: 
 
2
2 ( 2 1) 1E N D N D        (6-9) 
Based on the Formula 6-9, the trend of the black line with squares in Figure 6-8 is 
correct. 
Fast Recovery from Overlay Network Failures 
 
135 
 
However, the complexity of an exponential growth shown in Formula 6-9 is 
2
( )O n  
and the complexity of a linear growth is ( )O n . Thus, the condensed super routing 
table can save huge amount of storage space and this advantage becomes more 
significantly when multi-failure situations are involved or as the overlay network 
grows.  
Figure 6-13 shows the relationship between the average node degree and the total 
number of possible routing tables for a node. From this figure, the following 
observations can be made. Firstly, the larger the average node degrees, the larger 
number of routing tables required (without condensing). Secondly, the more brokers a 
topology has, the more number routing table variants there are. Then the more brokers 
a topology includes, the steeper the gradient. Those observations can be confirmed via 
formula 6-7 
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Figure 6-13 The Relationship between the Average Node Degree and Possible Routing Tables 
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6.3.2 PCRT / OSPF Performance Comparison 
Using a bespoke packet-level simulator, to demonstrate the benefit of our scheme for 
fast recovery from failures, various topologies were constructed, including the simple 
6-node one. This thesis compares PCRT and OSPF based on the topology shown in 
Figure 6-14 and has the following set up for all queues: the notional service bitrate is 
10000bits/unit time with a buffer capacity of 10 packets; the data packet generation 
rate at the source is 1 per unit time at a fixed interval; the data packet size is 1000 bits.  
 
Figure 6-14Six Nodes/Brokers Topology 
There is a source attached to the queue 29. All data packets will be sent to 
node/broker 3. Based on the routing table under the normal situation, the chosen path 
is node 1-node2-node 3 (i.e. least hop count). We run this simulation for 150 
time units and fail the link between node 2 and node 3 at time 50 and recover it at 
time 100. While the failure is in progress, the path from source to destination will be 
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node 1node 2node 6node 5node 3.  
The following figures (Figure 6-15 and Figure 6-16) show the time for a packet to 
traverse from source to destination: 
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Figure 6-15 End-to-End Packet Transfer Latency for Fast OSPF 
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Figure 6-16 End-to-End Packet Transfer Latency for PCRT 
1ot  and 1pt  are the time at which this system starts to send packets; 2ot  and 2 pt  
are the time at which the link between node/broker 2 to node/broker 3 fails; 3ot  and 
3 pt  are the time at which this system reconverges and successfully delivers packets 
again; 4ot  and 4 pt  are the time in which the system starts to use the recovered link 
and successfully deliver packets via the original path; t s are the time it takes for 
this system to reconverge. The PCRT does not need to exchange LSA messages as the 
whole network has been set up in advance. PCRT gets converge faster than OSPF, 
although for ‘fairness’ we set the heartbeat interval to be the same as the OSPF hello 
interval, so the detection times are the same. Even so the processing time of PCRT is 
less leading to a quicker switch to the recovery shortest path. In addition, PCRT is 
able to use the healed link quicker than for OSPF. Figure 6-17 shows the package loss 
during the time the system reconverges.  
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Figure 6-17 Reconvergence Packet Loss for OSPF / PCRT  
As the reconvergence time is still notably longer for ‘fast’ OSPF more packets are lost 
until an alternative path is found to the destination. For PCRT, the updated routing 
table information is ready to-hand as soon as the failure is discovered. 
6.4 Condensed Super Routing Table Validation for 
PCRT by using Model Checker 
The resilience and QoS of the messaging substrate plays a critical role in the overall 
system performance as perceived by the end users. While current systems and 
standards provide essential features of reliability, security, transactionality and 
persistence, there is little consideration for real-time QoS such as end-to-end latency 
and resilience.  
The advantages of overlay network routing have been discussed in Chapter 2. 
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However, sometimes human being will change the configuration of the routing table 
based on end user requirements or finding a shorter path geographically or predictable 
load balancing. As long as human beings are involved, it is necessary to have a 
mechanism of verifying this new configuration. On the other hand, even if no change 
has been made by human beings, a verification procedure can also guarantee the 
correctness of generating the condensed super routing ta ble. Therefore, after the 
program has automatically generated the condensed super routing table and the 
administrator has changed the configuration based on policy requirements, a 
verification procedure is applied for each broker.  
The data structure of a condensed super routing table has been described in the 
previous section. Comparing the model-checking model in Chapter 5, in this situation, 
the routing table is available and a new factor ‘Colour’ should be taken into 
consideration in the states transition conditions. This research will not verify the 
reachability or detect loops for the period when a failure happens and the overlay 
network has yet to converge. This is because if the overlay network has not converged 
and the brokers are under different colours, the reachability verification might fail due 
to temporary inconsistencies. However these kinds of errors are acceptable as they 
will only last milliseconds and the network will soon reconverge. Therefore, this 
research verifies the reachability and performs loop detection for each broker under 
the same colour, for all possible colours.  
The condensed super routing tables (Table 6-6, Table 6-7, Table 6-8 and Table 6-9) 
for broker 2 and broker 3 are listed as following:  
Colour 1 Colour 2 Colour 3 Colour 4 
Ult. 
Destination 
broker 
Next 
hop 
broker  
Ult. 
Destination 
broker 
Next 
hop 
broker  
Ult. 
Destination 
broker 
Next 
hop 
broker  
Ult. 
Destination 
broker 
Next 
hop 
broker  
1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 
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Table 6-6 A Part of Routing Tables Stored in Broker 2 
 
Super routing table 
Address Ult. Destination 
broker 
Next hop 
broker 
Colour 
1 1 1 1,3,4 
2 1 3 2 
3 3 3 1,2,3 
4 3 1 4 
Table 6-7 The Super Routing Table fo r Broker 2 
 
Colour 1 Colour 2 Colour 3 Colour 4 
Ult. 
Destination 
broker 
Next 
hop 
broker  
Ult. 
Destination 
broker 
Next 
hop 
broker  
Ult. 
Destination 
broker 
Next 
hop 
broker  
Ult. 
Destination 
broker 
Next 
hop 
broker  
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
Table 6-8 A Part of Routing Tables Stored in Broker 3 
 
Super routing table 
Address Ult. Destination 
broker 
Next hop 
broker 
Colour 
1 1 1 1,2,4 
2 2 2 1,2,3 
3 1 2 3 
4 2 1 4 
Table 6-9 The Super Routing Table fo r Broker 3 
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. ker
1 1 2 1
2 2 2 1
3 3 3 3
Colour
Dest Bro
A


 
 

 
  
            (6-10)
 
In the PCRT simulator, the routing tables for all the concerned situations and 
condensed super routing table as well as the two-dimensional lookup array can be 
generated automatically. After the administrator updates the configuration, the 
validation procedure commences. The NuSMV model checker builds a topology 
model based on the super routing table. The following is part of the program showing 
how to select the condensed super routing table entry: 
 
This part of the code shows all the possible entries when the current colour is ‘1’ and 
a message is currently located at broker 1. ‘Colour’ is a new state variable in the super 
routing table model. For example, if this message’s utility destination is broker 3, the 
next hop will be broker 3. The remaining code is similar to that described in Chapter 
5. 
 
next(loc) := 
 case      
  loc=1 & colour=1 & loc_des=1:1;      
  loc=1 & colour=1 & loc_des=2:2; 
  loc=1 & colour=1 & loc_des=3:3; 
 
  loc=1 & colour=2 & loc_des=1:1; 
  loc=1 & colour=2 & loc_des=2:3; 
  loc=1 & colour=2 & loc_des=3:3;    
…
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The following blocks provide validation simulation results: 
Input: 
NuSMV > go 
NuSMV > pick_state –r 
NuSMV > print_current_state –v 
 
Output: 
Current state is 1.1 
loc = 1 
colour = 1 
loc_des = 3 
The above block sets up the three broker model.  
Input: 
NuSMV > simulate –r 3 
Output: 
******* Simulation Starting From State 1.1 ******* 
 
Input: 
NuSMV > show_traces –t 
Output: 
There is 1 trace currently available. 
 
Input: 
NuSMV > show_traces –v 
Output 
<!-- ############### Trace number: 1 ############### --> 
Trace Description: Simulation Trace 
Trace Type: Simulation 
->State: 1.1 <- 
    loc = 1 
colour = 1 
loc_des = 3 
->State: 1.2 <- 
    loc = 3 
colour = 1 
loc_des = 3 
->State: 1.3 <- 
    loc = 1 
colour = 1 
loc_des = 3 
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->State: 1.4 <- 
    loc = 1 
colour = 1 
loc_des = 3 
The above block traces a route for three brokers model simulation. 
Input 
E:\NuSMV\bin>NuSMV PCRTthreeBrokers.smv 
 
Output 
--Specification EF loc = loc_des is true 
The above block shows results of verifying configurations 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
The PCRT algorithm introduced in this thesis is simpler, faster, loop free and more 
robust than several alternative state-of-the-art fast recovery mechanisms considered. 
Employing a new type of message named ‘Heart-beat’ message and creatively using 
‘colour’ to identify each different failure scenarios, this approach can save time 
associated with flooding link state database information and running Dijkstra’s 
algorithm to calculate new routing tables. In addition, the PCRT algorithm can 
decrease the time between sending regular Heartbeat notification messages to 
discover a failure faster without leading to a large amount of flooded messages.  
So far, the PCRT algorithm has focused on single link failures and the scheme 
appears to work well. Many researchers have expressed concern about pre-calculation 
of routing tables and their storage in a node/broker. Firstly, for a MOM overlay 
network, there not be numerous brokers so there will not be a great number of routing 
tables. Furthermore, based on this research, a mechanism for creating a condensed 
super routing table has been provided which saves a considerable amount of storage 
space for the brokers.  
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It is feasible for this PCRT algorithm to handle multi-link failures and node/nodes 
failures. Since all the calculations and condensing happen before launching the whole 
MOM system, there is enough time to configure data-structures for all possible 
failures combinations and condense routing tables into one super routing table. Then, 
modification and verification will be undertaken to guarantee the correctness of the 
configuration under each different colours (states) for a resilient mission critical 
MOM system.  
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7 Conclusions and Future Work 
7.1 Conclusions 
Mission critical message oriented middleware has been widely used in modern 
network systems, such as some wireless sensor networks [97] and some 
Internet-enabled enterprise systems [98].  However, the primary disadvantage of 
many message oriented middleware systems is that they require an extra component 
in the architecture, the message transfer agent (message broker). As with any system, 
adding another component can lead to a reduction in the performance and reliability, 
and can also make the system as a whole more difficult and expensive to maintain. 
The goal to this research is to find a suitable way to retain the performance and 
reliability for a MOM system after a failure or adding or removing components such 
as brokers.  
This work provides a means to proactively address possible failures in three ways. 
Firstly, before launching a mission critical MOM system, we propose a mechanism 
for checking the configuration and every topic’s reachability. Secondly, pre-calculate 
routing tables are generated under different failure situations, which may include all 
single link failure, certain double link failures or other multi-failures as well as node 
failures. When all the possible routing tables are created, a super condensed routing 
table will be generated where redundant information is omitted. Thirdly, given that 
modification can be made to routing information by humans (e.g. administrators) in 
response to traffic engineering preferences or policy decisions (i.e. static routing 
entries), we propose verifying the configuration of this super condensed routing table 
at a node whenever it is altered.  
This research automatically generates a publish/subscribe tester when a link table and 
a topic table are provided. The Java code generator that this research has developed 
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allows any user to build a model checking mechanism for a publish/subscribe system, 
even if the user has little knowledge of programming languages or of NuSMV. As 
mentioned in Chapter5 the number of topics may affect the number of verification 
rules. In our simple six-broker model, where there are only four different types of 
topics, the verification time can be neglected. However either in commercial products 
or in more complexes publish/subscribe system models the number of topics can be 
far greater. In this case, the number of topics could become a critical factor in the 
efficiency of the model checking.  
With the increasing number of brokers, manually generating a routing table for a 
large-scale MOM system is extremely complex. This research has designed a GUI 
interface to assist users to build a model and reduce the possibility of erroneous data 
entry. By using the GUI interface, users can input link information of brokers, which 
is much easier to obtain or understand than a routing table, and the program 
automatically generates a model of the link information. In this research, the routing 
table is then automatically generated based on a shortest path first algorithm.  
However, verifying the reachability and reconfiguration are not enough for ensuring 
the resilience of MOM systems. It is necessary to quickly recover from overlay 
network failures. So a verified pre-stored super routing table for all or most possible 
failures provides a way to improve the performance of a resilient mission critical 
MOM. 
7.2 Future Work 
There can be several improvements for the current research.  
1. When the model checker finds a misconfigured router or an unreachable path for 
a specific topic, a new function should be added to automatically resolve this fault 
rather than just highlighting its discovery. When an unreachable path is found, all 
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the sub-paths for that unreachable path could be checked one by one and errors 
rectified.  
2. This research could provide additional functions for verifying a realistic MOM 
system. Since lots of MOM systems are expected to provide an efficient and high 
quality message service, this research could help to check the rules for 
guaranteeing the end-to-end latency by using a probability model checker. Every 
broker would have a latency property and this research will check if paths are able 
to ensure a topic can reach its destination broker within the latency constraint 
[44]. 
3. In future, we will focus on additional means of improving the failure response 
time of the PCRT scheme. Similar to the smoothed Round Trip Time mechanism, 
used in the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) to optimise the Retransmission 
Time-Out (RTO) timer, our scheme could dynamically calibrate the transmission 
interval between heartbeat messages based on traffic load in the underlying 
network which affects the overlay link performance. On a ‘quiet’ link heartbeat 
messages are sent more frequently and the expiry time of link integrity timer, 
which is reset when heartbeat messages are received, could be set to a smaller 
value. This would allow for a rapid response to a link integrity failure. Conversely, 
when the overlay link is busy the expiry time would be increased to allow for the 
additional load. Additionally we might choose to increase the heartbeat emission 
interval to reduce the overhead on the link.  
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Appendix A 
F p: this formula will be true if p eventually become true:  
 
Figure A - 1LTL Formula ‘F p’ 
G p: this formula will be true if p is true at every state: 
 
Figure A - 2LTL Formula ‘G p’ 
p U q: this formula will be true if p is always true until q is true  
 
Figure A - 3LTL Formula ‘p U q’  
 
 
AX p: for all paths, p will be true in next state  
p AU q: for all paths, p is true until q is true  
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      Figure A - 4CTL Formula ‘AX p’ [32]             Figure A - 5CTL Formula ‘p AU q’ [32]  
EG p: there is at least one path in which p will be true all the time  
EF p: there is at least one path in which p will finally be true 
  
       Figure A- 6CTL Formula ‘EG p’ [32]          Figure A- 7CTL Formula ‘EF p’ [32]  
EX p: there is at least one path in which p is true in next state  
p EU q: there is at least one path in which p is true until q is true  
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      Figure A - 8 CTL Formula ‘EX p’ [32]            Figure A- 9CTL Formula ‘p EU q’ [32]  
 
 
